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ABSTRACT
MELATI NUNGSARI: Essays on Pricing and Matching on Two-Sided Platforms
(Under the direction of Gary Biglaiser.)
This dissertation consists of two essays on applied microeconomic theory, both
focusing on an economy where a single monopolist operating a two-sided matching
platform is strategically choosing prices to maximize profit. In this world, searching
for a long-term partners is costly, and the monopolist lessens this inconvenience by
providing a pool of potential partners to agents in exchange for a fee. Agents are
searching for long-term partners while on the platform and have preferences over
their potential partner’s characteristics. The first essay in this dissertation studies
the case where agents are horizontally differentiated. In the second essay, I study
the case where agents are vertically differentiated and also care about a random
horizontal component, modeled by using an idiosyncratic matching shock. As will
be evident, a very important finding in the second essay is the effects of externalities
on pricing.
In the first essay where types are horizontal, I assume that agent characteristics
are uniformly distributed on the unit circle, a´ la Salop (1979). I also assume that the
monopolist charges a two-part tariff. In the steady-state equilibrium, I show that
per-interaction prices are optimally set to be zero. In other words, the two-part tariff
pricing structure reduces to uniform pricing for all agents, regardless of type. I also
show that once agents are on the platform, they obtain a long-term match, marry and
leave the platform forever within finite time. In this model with horizontal types,
since agents prefer others whose types are closer to their own on the unit circle,
agents do not impose externalities on other agents by being on the platform. This
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is simply because there is no competition for ideal matches and the fact that one
man is able to marry his favorite woman does not exclude another man from doing
the same. In this model, faced with no externalities, agents are behaving socially
optimal. The firm has no incentive to distort the matching behavior of agents by
charging a non-zero per-interaction price.
In the second essay, I explore a world where agents are divided into two types,
studs (high types) and duds (low types). Everybody prefers to marry studs. In
addition to the vertical types, the utility functions for agents also depend on an
idiosyncratic matching shock. I use this shock to capture an element of horizontal
differentiation. In particular, the existence of this shock implies that even though
two studs go on a date, a marriage may not result if the idiosyncratic shock is bad.
Externalities enter the model in two ways, the first being through the proportion of
studs on the market, which all agents care about. The second way is through com-
petition for studs, who can be seen as rival goods. I find that when the monopolist
has the ability to observe types and split them into separate platforms, it will choose
to do so to maximize profits. In the case where the monopolist cannot separate
the agents, I solve for a steady-state equilibrium and study the variation in optimal
per-interaction prices used by the monopolist for different types of distributions for
the idiosyncratic shock. When types are observable and the monopolist operates as
a social planner, I characterize parameter ranges for which the firm charges distor-
tionary (non-zero) levels of per-interaction prices to correct for externalities on the
platform.
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Chapter 1
Pricing and Matching with Horizontal Types
1.1 Introduction
The study of two-sided markets is relatively new in industrial organization. A two-
sided market is a market where agents are brought together by a platform or network.
The platform is segmented into two “sides”, where it is assumed that the two sides
face some level of difficulty in coming together without the help of the platform.
There are many examples of real-life two-sided markets. One well-researched market
is the credit card network. The two sides of a credit card platform (say, Visa) are
the consumers (users) who own and use the cards and the merchants (sellers) who
choose to accept Visa payments. The more merchants who accept Visa cards and the
more membership benefits offered by Visa, the more attractive the network becomes
to users. On the other hand, merchants also prefer to join a credit card network
that is home to a large number of customers. Another example is Alibaba.com, a
Chinese company that facilitates B2B (business-to-business) transactions. Alibaba
functions as a medium to bring suppliers, wholesalers, and manufacturers together,
essentially forming a trading network between all levels of suppliers. Some other
examples include video games platforms like Nintendo Wii (where the two sides are
the game developers and players), heterosexual nightclubs (men and women), and
the college Greek system (current members of a fraternity and alumni).
There are many utility specifications for agents participating in two-sided markets
that are studied in the literature. For example, agents on one side of the market may
compete with other agents on the same side for the attention of members from the
opposite side of the market. In this case, utility is strictly decreasing in the number
of agents on the same side. Agents may also exhibit increasing utility in the number
of agents on the other side of the market, preferring that there be more agents on
the opposite side to potentially match with. Utility may, of course, exhibit both of
these characteristics, which can be seen in the case where the platform studied is a
dating or marriage market. In this situation, agents both prefer a variety and large
numbers of potential matches and also compete within their own side to obtain a
match.
Besides caring about the number of agents on either of the sides, agents may
also care about particular types of agents. In the case where all agents on a side
agree on the ranking of a type for the opposite side, types are said to be vertically
differentiated. In a highly simplified world where everyone cares only about beauty,
attractiveness would be a vertically differentiated characteristic. The case where
all agents do not agree on the ranking of types and each type of agent has their
’ideal’ type is called horizontal differentiation. For example, in real-life, we see many
examples of characteristics for which agents prefer types closer to their own. In
general, everyone does not agree that there is a ‘best’ or ideal Body Mass Index
(BMI) for a potential match. This of course varies from person to person. It can
also be argued that many people would prefer a match whose body type resembles
their own, and exhibit decreasing utility the further their match’s BMI moves away
from theirs.
In the world of two-sided markets, platforms function as intermediaries and make
profit by charging a fee to one side in order to provide network access to agents
on the other. The prices set by the platforms may be different for both sides. For
example, a nightclub that is trying to attract women may charge negative prices to
the women but charge positive prices to men. An easy way to think about these
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negative prices is subsidizing women’s entrance fee and providing free drinks upon
entry to the club.
One may ask the natural question of the necessity of studying two-sided markets
versus focusing efforts on single-sided markets with no physical intermediary or plat-
form. What can a two-sided market explain that a one-sided market cannot? First of
all, even though most markets can be thought of as being “two-sided”, most markets
do not have a platform that strategically behaves in setting prices or organizing the
market to provide access to agents. Moreover, Rochet and Tirole (2006) argue that
a two-sided market should be defined as one in which the volume of transactions
between end-users depend on the structure of the market and not only on the overall
level of fees charged by the platform. In particular, a two-sided platform’s value is
really the benefits or access it is able to provide to the agents. They stress that the
effectiveness of a platform as an intermediary depends heavily on the fact that the
two sides of the market cannot easily get together on their on.
This idea that a platform primarily serves as a means to connect people who would
otherwise have no access to each other ties in the long-standing literature on search.
Thinking back to the nightclub example, note that the most that the nightclub can
do is to bring a large group of men and women together. The agents’ abilities to
find a match for the night then crucially depends on how much effort he or she puts
into searching for said match. I assert that there is a natural connection between
search models, matching, and two-sided platform pricing. The purpose of this paper
is to combine these three elements in order to study how a monopolist would price
its services in the presence of agents who are horizontally differentiated and are
searching for matches. I do so by extending the spatial horizontal differentiation
model employed by Salop (1979). This paper also embeds the matching problem
into a two-sided platform pricing model by using the commonly used search model
from McCall (1970). The current literature has not paid much attention to combining
these three elements that I have mentioned, and so this paper makes a small but novel
3
contribution to the field.
Figure 1.1: A New York Times article featuring FarmersOnly.com
There are many pricing schedules that are offered by two-sided platforms. Arm-
strong (2006) characterizes three main factors that determine the structure of prices
offered to the two groups. The first and most important is the relative size of inter-
group externalities. For concreteness, suppose that the two sides of the market are
sides A and B. If A exerts a large positive externality on B, the platform will ag-
gressively target agents on side A. In a competitive market setting, A’s benefits to
B will determine A’s pricing, and not how much A benefits from the presence of B.
Secondly, a common choice of pricing structures if the choice of whether or not to
employ a uniform fixed fee or a per-transaction charge or both (two-part tariffs). In
particular, platforms might charge for their services on a lump-sum (fixed) basis, so
that an agent’s payment does not explicitly depend on how well the platform per-
forms in attracting agents from the other side. On the other hand, a platform may
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want to charge per-interaction fees in the case where the platform has successfully
managed to court a good distribution of agents from the opposite side. The final
characteristic that may determined the pricing structure is whether or not agents
on both sides single or multi-home. Agents who single-home choose to use only one
platform while agents who multi-home use many platforms.
One particular real-life application that I would like to focus on due to having a
large number of agents who search while on the platform are online dating websites.
The online dating industry is extremely successful with total revenues from 2012
reaching $2.1 billion.1 One of the biggest players in this market, eHarmony, reported
that they were responsible for nearly 5% of marriages in the US in the year 2009.2
Although the industry in general has been doing extremely well, a subset of these
dating websites has been even more successful. This subset of websites are niche
websites. Niche dating platforms are platforms are platforms that cater to agents
who are interested in matching with partners with very specific attributes. For
example, the website FarmersOnly.com caters to “farmers, ranchers, animal lovers,
nature lovers and other rural and country folk with traditional values.” Figure 1
depicts the popularity of said dating websites through coverage in popular media.3
This preference of wanting to be matched with somebody else whose type is close to
your own is modeled in this paper using horizontally differentiated characteristics.
As the survey of prices in Table 1 indicates, online dating websites use a variety
of pricing structures. I will first solve the model where the firm only charges a fixed
fee to enter the platform (uniform pricing), and then extend this to the model where
the firm charges a fixed fee and per-transaction fees afterward in each period for each
date (two-part tariffs). The main result of the paper is that two-part tariff pricing
reduces to uniform pricing in a steady-state equilibrium; that is, that per-interaction
1IBISWorld Dating Services 2014 Market Research Report.
2www.eharmony.com
3Published on April 27, 2008 in the New York Times (online) by J. Courtney Sullivan.
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Table 1.1: Pricing Structures of Online Dating Firms
Online Dating Website Niche Pricing Structure
Lavalife No $19.99/month
eHarmony Yes $59.95/month
AshleyMadison Yes $48 for 100 credits
WeWaited Yes $29.95/year
DateHarvardSq Yes $19.99/year for Harvard affiliates,
39.99/year for non-affiliates
BeautifulPeople Yes $25/month
DateMyPet Yes $6.66 to 14.95/month
SeniorPeopleMeet Yes $13.95 to 19.95/month
420Dating Yes $9.95/month
VeggieDate Yes $9.95/month
DemocratSingles, ConservativeDates Yes $19.95/month
Match No $39.99/month
PerfectMatch Yes $59.95/month
Chemistry Yes $49.95/month
Cupidtino Yes $4.79/month
Shaadi Yes $500 for 3 months
It’s Just Lunch Yes $2600 for 6 months and 5 dates
prices are set to zero. Intuitive reasoning as to why this is true will be given in
a later section. This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 will explore previous
contributions to the literature, Section 1.3 presents the model and results, Section
1.4 concludes, and Section 1.5 is the appendix.
1.2 Literature Review
Rysman (2009) argues that two-sided platforms and networks are “distinguished by
its focus on the actions of the market intermediary.” Research on two-sided markets
generally explores decisions of platforms who act as market intermediaries in the
presence of some sort of interdependence on externalities between the two sides that
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the platform serves. This externality could of course involve usage or membership
to the platform. For example, Rysman (2009) posits that merchants on a credit
card platform do not care about how many other merchants on the platform there
are but the merchants do care about how many customers are subscribed to the
platform. In a sense, a platform’s attractiveness and value is derived completely
from its ability to provide each side with interactions with agents from the opposite
side. This is a common theme in the two-sided literature: most work is done on
between group externalities and do not focus on much on competition within a side
to obtain interactions with agents on the other side. In fact, it seems as though this
subset of the literature may lead to a very fertile ground of research, since many two-
sided markets possess this characteristic of competition within a side. For example,
it’s very easy to see how a dating website exhibits this behavior. Even though there
may be many agents on the opposite side, agents on a particular side always faces
competition from agents on their side to obtain a good match.
One of the seminal papers in the two-sided market literature is Armstrong (2006).
Armstrong (2006) places a strong emphasis on the effects of inter-group network ex-
ternalities on pricing. In particular, as stated in the introduction, he posited three
main pricing structures from the point of view of the firm. He expands the earlier
work by Rochet and Tirole (2006) by modifying the specifications of agent utili-
ties, the structure of platform fees, and the structure of platform costs. Armstrong
presents three models of two-sided markets: monopoly platforms, competing plat-
forms where agents join a single platform (single-home), and ‘competitive bottle-
necks’ where one group of agents joins all platforms (multihomes).
Weyl (2010) makes great progress in further studying heterogeneity in two-sided
platforms by developing a theory of monopolistic platform pricing. In his paper,
Weyl extends the basic framework of Rochet and Tirole (2006) and propose a more
plausible (yet equally tractable) model of heterogeneity in which agents differ in their
income. Weyl’s model incorporates a continuum of users and gives a general measure
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of market power in order to study policy questions. These policy questions include
those of price regulations and dealing with mergers of platforms. Weyl also studies
socially optimal pricing for a monopolistic platform and compares it to Pigouvian,
profit-maximizing and Ramsey prices.
There are of course many variations to the main frameworks employed in the two-
sided market literature. For example, Hagiu (2006) studies two-sided platforms in
which the sellers and buyers on the platform do not arrive at the same time. Cabral
(2011) considers a dynamic model of competition between networks where consumers
die and firm continuously compete Bertrand-style for new consumers. He then goes
on to studying termination charges within wireless communications networks, where
customers and eligible for lower prices for a set period and then pay higher prices
once that period is over.
The seminal paper in the matching literature is undoubtedly the paper by Gale
and Shapley (1962). In a two-sided matching model, agents often have a preference
over all the agents on the other side from whom they would form a match with.
Hoppe et al. (2011) work off the basic assortative matching framework and present
a model of costly signaling with heterogeneous agents. Kojima and Pathak (2009)
study stability in two-sided matching markets. They find that under some regularity
conditions, the proportion of agents with incentives to lie about their preferences
when all other agents are truthful approached zero as the market becomes very
large. Azevedo and Leshno (2012) found that in both the discrete and continuum
two-sided matching markets with heterogeneous agents, stable matchings have a very
simple structure, with matches being formed if agents on each side are ranked above
a certain threshold.
This paper is most closely related to work done by Halaburda and Piskorski
(2011), and Damiano and Li (2007). Halaburda and Piskorski (2011) explored com-
petition among search platforms. They found that increasing the number of agents
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on each side of the market not only has a positive effect due to large choice (i.e. pos-
itive inter-group network externalities), but also a negative effect due to competition
between agents on the same side (i.e. negative intra-group network externalities).
Agents resolve the trade off between these externalities differently; in particular,
agents with low outside options face stronger competition effects than they do choice
effects. Thus, these agents have a higher willingness to pay for a platform restricting
choice, and vice versa. Damiano and Li (2007) study the problem of a monopoly
matchmaker that uses a schedule of entrance fees to sort different types of agents
on the two sides of a matching market into exclusive ‘meeting places’, where agents
randomly form pairwise matches and obtain a match with probability one.
The model presented in this paper combines elements from the matching and
pricing literatures. In particular, it extends the Salop (1979) model to incorporate
matching. The Salop (1979) model is a variant of the Hotelling (1929) model of spa-
tial competition. Salop (1979) introduces an economy consisting of two industries: a
monopolistically competitive industry with differentiated brands and decreasing av-
erage costs and a competitive industry producing a homogeneous commodity. Agents
incur a transportation cost for buying a brand that deviates from his or her most-
preferred brand and this then influences the pricing structure. This model provides
a benchmark for subsequent analyses with non-uniform preferences.
1.3 Model
1.3.1 Environment
This is an infinite-horizon model with discrete time. There is a single monopolist
operating a matching platform that caters to two sides. I call one side ‘women’
and the other ‘men’. Each side of the market has characteristics distributed on the
circumference of the unit circle. Denote this characteristic by x ∈ [0, 1]. Let x be
distributed according to the uniform distribution with cumulative function F and
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the corresponding density function f . Agents and the firm discount at the same rate
δ.
I will explore two cases for pricing from the point of view of the monopolist. First,
I will consider the baseline case when the monopolist only charges a fee to join the
platform, and charges nothing else for further interactions with other agents. The
second case that I consider will be when the monopolist charges a two-part tariff to
all agents; that is, agents get charged a fixed fee to first enter the platform and then
get charged a fee for each interaction they have with others on the platform. I will
be focusing on equilibrium in steady-state.
Faced with the pricing schedule set by the monopolist, timing in this model
proceeds as follows:
1. Agents decide whether or not to join the platform.
2. Agents who decide to join the platform receive a random draw of a new match.
They either pay or not for this draw, depending on the pricing strategy em-
ployed by the firm.
3. Agents meet up, learn each other’s type, and decide whether or not to marry.
If both agents decide to marry, they obtain their matching utility (defined
below) and leave the platform forever.4 If one or both of the agents decide not
to marry, they continue searching by proceeding to the next period.
I assume that there is a matching benefit b > 0 which is common to all agents. This
term captures the overall benefit that individuals obtain when married. An agent’s
ideal type is assumed to be her own and agents face a cost which increases in distance
with marrying a type that is not her own. This cost is denoted by c > 0 and serves
4I have made the modeling decision to assume that a marriage is forever and divorces never
happen. This is of course debatable in reality–in fact, the national average divorce rate occurring
from first-time marriages in 2014 was close to 25%. However, since I am not interested in how
divorce rates affect pricing, I have decided to make this simplifying assumption; regardless, I assert
that this assumption does not have a strong effect on my results.
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as a per-unit distance cost of marrying away from an agent’s ideal type. In real life,
if I used height as a main characteristic that people match on, it’s easy to see that
one’s ideal type is probably not the tallest or shortest person in the world. Rather,
people probably desire to marry others who are of similar heights to themselves.
I can now define the matching utility obtained by agent x when he chooses to
marry agent y as
ux(y) ≡ b− c | x− y |
1− δ (1.1)
This utility is multiplied by 1
1−δ , which is a result of geometric discounting and
takes into account the fact that a marriage lasts forever if agents decide to leave the
platform. The distance metric | measures the shortest arc-length between x and y
on the unit circle.
1.3.2 Baseline: Uniform Pricing
Agent’s Problem
Assume that the monopolist charges only a fixed fee f to all agents. I first intro-
duce the strategy for the agents. In general, agents can choose to marry whomever
they want–however, we will see later on that optimality dictates that all agents will
employ a ‘threshold’ strategy when deciding who to marry. All agents obtain 0 as a
reservation utility.
Definition 1 An agent’s strategy is a function s : [0, 1]→ {accept, reject}
Faced with the draw of a match in a particular period, an agent’s strategy provides
an accept or reject answer to the match. A marriage only forms if and only if both
agents accept; in the case where one or both agents reject the match, agents continue
searching and proceed to the next period. In steady-state, I can define the Bellman
Equation for the agents. The Bellman Equation does not involve f since agents
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treat this cost as sunk when they are making their marrying decisions once on the
platform.
Definition 2 The Bellman Equation for an agent of type x is
Vx(.) = max{ u
x(.)
1− δ , δ
∫ 1
0
Vx(.) dF (.)} (1.2)
where Cx ≡ δ
∫ 1
0
Vx(.) dF (x) is the expected discounted continuation utility of being
on the platform.
Using standard techniques used in search models, I show that the optimal strategy
for the agent will be a threshold strategy, where agent x will accept and marry all
agents who are in the -ball around x; that is, x will accept any agent in [x− , x+ ]
and reject all agents outside of this interval. This can easily be seen from the Bellman
equation.
To see this, note that the right-hand side is what the agents obtain if they reject
their current draw. This value, which is denoted Cx, is constant regardless of the
draw. The left-hand side of what the agents obtain if they accept their current
draw and it increases as | x − y | decreases, where y is the type of the agent that
x is deciding whether or not to marry. Next, I derive . For a visual aid on the
-threshold strategy, please refer to Figure 2.
Proposition 1 The -threshold for each agent is given by
 = min{1
2
,
−c(1− δ) +√(1− δ)(c2(1− δ) + 4bδ)
2cδ
} (1.3)
There are a couple of simple implications from Proposition 1. First of all, note
that the -threshold for agents is independent of type. Also, regardless of the strategy
of the opposite agent y 6= x, x’s best response is always to use an -strategy. This is
proven below. Since each player’s  is the same and only depends on the parameters
of the model, symmetry implies that if an agent x wishes to form a match with agent
12
Figure 1.2: Illustration of the −strategy employed by agents
y, then y will want to form a match with agent x. This is a very nice result of
this model and comes from the strong assumption of uniformity in types along the
circumference of the circle. Without the uniform distribution of types, it is unclear
whether this problem is tractable. In particular, a match between x and y would
only form in the situation with non-uniform types if both x is within the -interval
of y, and vice versa. The -threshold in my model is constrained to be at most 1
2
,
following the fact that types are distributed on the unit circle with circumference 1.
This assumption is imposed to ensure that an agent’s -ball does not overlap itself
twice around the circle.
Proposition 2 Given any other strategy employed by y 6= x, x’s best response will
always be an -threshold.
Now, define ¯ =
−c(1−δ)+
√
(1−δ)(c2(1−δ)+4bδ)
2cδ
. For the case when ¯ < 1
2
, that is when the
-threshold is non-binding, I can do simple comparative statics on the parameters of
the model. In the case where  = 1
2
, the -threshold is said to be binding and the
parameters of the model have no effects on agent’s optimal behavior.
Proposition 3 In the case where ¯ < 1
2
:
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• ∂
∂b
> 0
• ∂
∂δ
< 0
• ∂
∂c
< 0
This proposition has intuitive interpretations. The term  corresponds to how picky
an agent is when it comes to matching. A larger  corresponds to a larger potential
matching set and so the agent is less picky since she is willing to marry agents whose
types are considerably further from her own. As the overall benefit that an agent
obtains increases; that is as b becomes larger, an agent is on average more keen on
marrying regardless of the type of the match she draws in that period. This will
cause the agent to be less picky and thus increases the -ball of acceptance. As δ
increases, the agent becomes more patient and so is willing to wait for longer to get
a good marriage match. This causes his or her -ball to shrink and she is willing to
stay on the platform for longer to wait to marry someone whose type is closer to her
own. Note that this is only true since agents only pay a waiting cost of δ for staying
on the platform to search. Once a per-interaction price is imposed on the agents
to obtain a new match and continue searching, the cost of staying on the platform
increases in proportion to the fee imposed. An increase in the cost of matching away
from an agent’s own type, c, causes agents to be more picky. Holding every other
parameter constant, as c increases, agents face a heavier penalty of marrying away
from their own types. This causes them to be less likely to accept ‘bad’ matches of
agents whose types are far from their own, which will in turn decrease . A higher
per-unit distance matching cost causes agents to want to wait for better draws of
matches in hopes that the match will be closer to their own type, all else equal.
Dynamics
I focus on steady-state equilibrium in this model. In solving for steady-state, I equate
the outflows and inflows into the platform in order to solve for a constant mass of
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agents on the platform. At the beginning of time t, there is a mass of µt agents
already on the platform. At the same time, a mass of size 1 of agents are born
outside the platform and a proportion it of these agents choose to join the platform.
Agents who are on the platform marry at rate ot in period t, where ot is endogenous
and determined by the  threshold term.
Thus, in each period t, a mass of size (1 − ot)µt remains on the platform after
the exit of the otµt agents who have married in the period. A new group of agents
of size it then decide to enter the platform. This gives the transitional equation for
µt as
µt = (1− ot)µt + it (1.4)
In solving for the constant distribution of agents in steady-state, I set the total
inflows equal to total outflows in each period, which gives
ot µt = it ∀t (1.5)
which implies that
µ =
i
o
(1.6)
Since agents are uniformly distributed on the unit circle, the probability that any
agent obtains a match is precisely the length of their -interval. Thus, it must be
that ot = 2 ∀t. This reduces the steady-state equation to
µ =
i
2
(1.7)
where the mass of agents on each side of the platform is constant in steady-state.
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Monopolist Pricing
I assume that the monopolist fully commits to a path of constant prices throughout
time and can perfectly observe the types of the agents.5 The monopolist solves the
following problem in steady-state.
max
f
2f
s. t. (IR) : Cx()− f ≥ 0 ∀x
The solution to this optimization problem is simple. The objective function is strictly
linearly increasing in f . The monopolist will set f so that Cx = f where Cx = C ∀x
since the -thresholds are independent of type. This implies that the monopolist lets
all types onto the platform, effectively setting it = 1 ∀t. From the point of view of
the monopolist, all agents are identical. This then reduces the earlier steady-state
equation to
µ =
1
2
(1.8)
Equilibrium
Combining the steady-state condition with the solution to the agent’s problem allows
me to examine the steady-state equilibrium. As shown below, the probability that
an agent obtains a match approaches 1 as time progresses in this model.
Proposition 4 A symmetric steady-state equilibrium exists where all agents marry
while on the platform in finite time.
5As we see later, an important fact to note here is that since the monopolist can perfectly observe
types, it can charge prices to extract all surplus from agents. In particular, the monopolist will
behave like a malevolent social planner who maximizes total agent surplus only to extract it all
using prices. This will be explored in more depth later in this chapter and will play an important
role in the next chapter as well.
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Proof. Given the price f charged by the monopolist, it is clear that all agents will
participate. The mass of agents who participate will be determined by the steady-
state condition in (1.8). What needs to proven now is whether all of the agents
will marry while on the platform. Since agents are uniformly distributed, they are
essential identical and have the same . Since the distribution of agents on both sides
is uniform, the probability of being married is given by
P (married) =
2
1
= 2
Since each period is identical and independent, the probability that an agent has yet
to marry by time T is
P (not married by time T ) =
T∏
t=1
P (not married) = (1− 2)T
As T →∞, we have that P (not married by time T )→ 0, since 2 ≤ 1.
This result is again a consequence of having agents uniformly distributed. All
agents have the same -thresholds, which reduces and simplifies the model signif-
icantly. In the case where agents are not uniformly distributed, agents may have
different -thresholds, which means that each agent will have a distinct probability
of marrying in each period. This complicates solving the model significantly; in fact,
as stated previously, it is not clear whether this problem is even tractable.
1.3.3 Two-Part Tariffs
Now, I assume that the monopolist is able to charge both a fixed price f and a
per-interaction price p. An example in real-life of this is a dating or match-making
website that charges you a fee to gain access for their services, and then a fee for each
person they set you up with. There is still a single monopolist operating one platform
with agents having characteristics distributed uniformly on the circumference of the
unit circle. Time is discrete and agents are infinitely lived. The monopolist is also
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assumed to fully commit to a set of prices from the beginning of time and can also
perfectly observe types.
The timing proceeds as follows. In each period, the monopolist sets the fixed
price f . Given f , agents decide whether or not to join the platform. Once agents
have paid the price f , agents must pay p in next period to obtain a new random draw
of a date. Once agents receive the draw, they meet up in the same period, learn each
other’s characteristics and decide whether or not to marry. If they marry, they leave
the market forever and obtain the flow matching utility in each period thereafter. If
they do not marry, they must move to the next period and pay another p in order
to obtain a new random draw.
In this part of the model, I wish to characterize the signs on the prices f and p.
In particular, I am interested in whether or not the per-interaction price p is zero.
As before, I am focusing on a steady-state equilibrium. Since the firm can perfectly
observe prices, it can use said prices to affect the matching behavior of agents on the
platform. In particular, the firm can manipulate per-interaction prices to change the
behavior of agents when it comes to deciding who to marry. A per-interaction price
that is not zero is distortionary–that is, it forces agents to change the set of people
they marry in a way that they may be would not have in the absence of prices. In
particular, a positive per-interaction price causes agents to be less picky, making
them increase the set of agents from the opposite side that they would be willing to
marry.
Agent’s Problem
The agent’s matching utility remains the same from the baseline model. In particular,
the matching utility for type x who chooses to match with type y is
ux(y) ≡ b− c | x− y |
1− δ (1.9)
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where the utility is discounted since I assume that if and when agents match, they
do so forever. Just as a reminder, the distance function | measures the shortest arc-
length between x and y, b > 0 is the benefit of matching which is the same for all
agents, c > 0 is the cost function for matching with a person whose characteristic is
far from your own.
Agents take prices to be given when they match. Type x’s Bellman equation is
now given by
Vx(.) = max{u
x(y)
1− δ , δ(
∫ 1
0
Vx(.) dF (.)− p)} (1.10)
The difference between the Bellman equation here and the one from the baseline
model is that I have to take into account the fact that agents must pay p in order
to obtain a new random draw in the next round. I can solve for the -thresholds
similarly in this case.
Proposition 5 All agents have the same -threshold given by
 = min{1
2
,
c(δ − 1) +√c(δ − 1)(c(δ − 1)− 4δ(b+ pδ))
2cδ
}
Note that the  now depends on the per-interaction price p. For ease of notation,
define
¯ =
c(δ − 1) +√c(δ − 1)(c(δ − 1)− 4δ(b+ pδ))
2cδ
The expression for  includes the min function to ensure that the -interval does not
wrap twice around the circle. I can now demonstrate simple comparative statics on
the -thresholds.
Proposition 6 In the case where ¯ ≤ 1
2
, we have that
• ∂
∂p
≥ 0
• ∂
∂b
≥ 0
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• ∂
∂δ
≤ 0
• ∂
∂c
≤ 0
Recall that a larger  indicates that an agent is less picky, while a smaller  indicates
that an agent is becoming more picky with respect to whom he or she marries. I
obtain the standard results that we have already seen with the three parameters of the
model (δ, c and b). An agent becomes less picky as she becomes more patient. This
is an intuitive result: as δ → 1, the agent values the future more and is comfortable
with staying on the platform to obtain a good marriage partner. However, comparing
this result to the one obtained from the baseline model, I would expect this result
to be attenuated by the fact that an agent has to pay a cost to stay on the platform
in each period compared to the baseline model where staying on the platform was
costless once you had already paid the fixed fee f . As the matching cost c increases,
agents become less picky and would rather marry an agent whose type is very close
to their own. As the matching benefit b increases, agents obviously become less picky
as they prefer to just marry anyone.
The most interesting comparative static is obtained when I analyze how changing
the per-interaction fee affects the -threshold of the agent. The previous proposition
gives that an agent becomes less picky as p increases. This is intuitive since a higher p
corresponds to a higher cost of staying on the platform. Increasing the per-interaction
price will encourage agents to marry quicker since being on the platform becomes
more costly. Agents will marry quicker by increasing the length of their -intervals,
which in turn enlarges the possible marrying set.
Dynamics
The dynamics are as before and I will focus on a steady-state equilibrium. The
main difference here is that the per-interaction price p will influence how fast agents
match on the platform. At the beginning of each period t, there is a mass µt of
agents. Agents find matches and leave the platform at rate ot(p), and there are
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it(f, p) agents who join the platform. Note that the outflow rate depends on the
per-interaction price p, and since the firm gets to decide how many people to join
the platform, the inflow rate is also an indirect choice variable from the firm. The
firm essentially controls the inflow rate by changing the f .
The transitional equation for µt is
µt+1 = (1− ot(p))µt + it(f, p) (1.11)
In steady-state, I am able to use the condition that total outflow from the platform,
which is o(p)µ, is equal to total inflow onto the platform, which is i(f, p). This then
allows me to solve for a constant mass of agents on the platform.
o(p)µ = i(f, p) (1.12)
I can simplify this further by recalling that agents find matches at rate 2(p), giving
that o(p) ≡ 2(p). The steady-state condition finally becomes
µ =
i(f, p)
o(p)
(1.13)
Monopolist’s Problem
The monopolist steady-state profit can be written as
Πss = 2(i(f)f +
∞∑
t=0
δt+1pi(f)(1− o(p))t) (1.14)
The monopolist can extract f from all of the agents who are allowed onto the platform
and change then charge p for each period after. For ease of exposition, take an
example. An agent who has been on the platform in period t = 3 would have been
unsuccessful in finding a match in the past two time periods. This occurs with
probability (1 − o)2. In particular, after T periods, there will be i(1 − o)T agents
on the platform. The monopolist can extract p from each of these i(1 − o)T agents
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on the platform and discounts each of these periods by δ. This gives the expression∑∞
t=0 δ
t+1pi(f)(1− o(p))t in the profit function. The new cohort of agents who join
the platform will be charged f and there are i(f) of them, giving the term i(f) f .
The constant in front of the profit function, although irrelevant to the optimization
problem, is present to signify that the platform extracts this sum of profits from two
sides of the market.6
Evaluating (1.14) gives
Πss = 2(if +
δip
1− δ(1− o)) (1.15)
Since types are observable, we have only a participation constraint in the firm’s
optimization problem, which is given as follows.
max
p,f
Πss
s. t. (IRx) Cx(p)− f ≥ 0 ∀x
where Cx is the expected lifetime utility of x being on the platform. By Proposition
5, the -thresholds for all agents are the same and so Cx = C ∀x. This means that
the optimal f will be
6 An important fact to note is that there are essentially two ways of calculating profits: the first
is to follow the same cohort for their entire lives and the second is to monitor the dynamics onto
and off the platform, taking into account different cohorts that enter at different times. This way
of writing profit would be expressed as
∞∑
t=0
2{f it(f) + µt p}
This way of writing profit is incorrect since it allows for the firm to profitably deviate in equilibrium.
The reason is because since there is a mass of agents who remain from last period (t− 1), the firm
could potentially renege on their commitment to a price path, reoptimize, and charge higher prices
from time t onwards to the old cohort. My calculation of the profits follow the cohort who joined
in steady-state for the rest of their lives while on the platform and is correct since the firm is
optimizing given the mass of people starting from today and fully commits to that price path.
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C = f (1.16)
Referring back to the dynamics, note that since the monopolist can observe types,
he will charge f to bind the individual rationality constraint. As we will see later,
the firm will also let in all agents whose individual rationality constraints bind onto
the platform. (1.13).
Equilibrium
Now, I solve for equilibrium by combining the steady-state conditions, firm optimality
conditions, and agent’s optimal matching behavior.
Proposition 7 Consider the profit function given by (1.15).
• Πss is linear in i and ∂Πss∂i > 0, implying that i is optimally set to be 1.
• The firm optimally sets p = 0.
From the proposition, the firm wants to let everyone who wants to join the plat-
form on so that it can extract more surplus. However, combining the steady-state
conditions with firm’s optimality gives us the following proposition.
Proposition 8 A symmetric, steady-state equilibrium in this model has the following
characteristics:
1. The per-interaction price is p = 0 for all agents.
2. The fixed fee is then set so that f = C |p=0 for all agents.
3. i is set so that
i = 1
4. The probability that any agent on the platform receives a match approaches 1
as time approaches ∞.
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The equilibrium characterization is very clean and simplistic for two reasons. The
first is that since agents are uniformly distributed over the circumference of a circle
and the firm can perfectly observe types, agents are essentially identical to the firm.
Secondly, given the utility specification, the -thresholds are the same for all agents,
and that if one agent is willing to marry another, then a marriage necessarily forms.
In other words, if one man’s type is in a woman’s -ball, then the woman’s type is
necessarily within the man’s -ball. If the -thresholds were different in any way,
the matching equilibrium would be very messy, leading to a correspondingly messy
pricing equilibrium in steady-state.
1.4 Conclusion
In this essay, I have presented a stylized model where a monopolist operates a two-
sided matching platform in the presence of horizontally-differentiated agents. Agents
prefer to match with their own type but will accept matches within an -ball of
their own type. I explored two pricing equilibriums: one where I assume that the
monopolist charges a uniform fixed fee and another where the monopolist charges a
two-part tariff.The main finding in this paper is that the two-part tariff case reduces
to the uniform pricing case, where the fixed fee is charged to extract all surplus from
agents and the per-transaction fee is set to 0. I have also found that all agents will
find a match in finite time once on the platform. These results are very clean and the
model provides a good foundation to study other issues related to two-sided matching
platforms. In particular, one might imagine a model where the monopolist splits the
one platform containing all of the agents who are distributed along the circumference
of the circle into smaller platforms which cater to a more narrow and ‘specialized’ set
of agents. Studying a model like this would shed some light on niche dating websites
and their increasing popularity amongst internet users, as highlighted early in the
paper.
One may also want to study how a monopolist platform, as depicted in this paper,
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would price in the presence of vertically-differentiated agents. In the next chapter,
I study this question by introducing a two-type model where agents match on not
only type but also an idiosyncratic shock which measures a horizontal component in
preferences. In the second chapter, externalities, and in particular, rivalry between
agents, will play an important role in how optimal pricing is determined. Since
every agent agrees on the ranking of characteristics, everyone will want to match
with a high type and will expend a considerable amount of effort, time, and money
staying on the platform to do so. The monopolist will price accordingly to correct
this externality and I find that it is optimal for some parameter ranges to charge a
non-zero (distortionary) per-interaction price.
One last note to be made is that the horizontal differentiation model studied in
this chapter does not exhibit the same externalities that the vertical model in the
next chapter does. In a horizontal differentiation model, agents do not agree on the
ranking of the characteristics–in fact, each agent has their own ideal type. This being,
there is no competition amongst agents for the ‘best’ type because there essentially
is none. An agent’s ability to marry his or her ideal type does not take away from
another agent’s ability to do so as well. This being, externalities are not present, the
agents behave socially and privately optimally, and the monopolist does not have
an incentive to manipulate their matching behavior by charging a non-distortionary
per-interaction price.
1.5 Appendix
Proposition (1)
Proof. To find the -threshold for an agent x, I must find the type y¯ for which x is
indifferent between forming a match with and not. That is,
ux(y¯)
1− δ = δ
∫ 1
0
Vx(y) dF (y) (1.17)
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By the definition of y¯, we have that | y¯ − x |= . We also have that the right-hand
side of the previous equation can be rewritten as
δ
1− δ (
∫ x+
x−
(ux(y)− ux(y¯)) dy +
∫ 1
0
ux(y¯) dy)
because agents receive the same utility outside of the -interval since they choose
not to match. The symmetry of the -interval allows for much simplification. Now,
(1.17) may be rewritten as
b− c
1− δ =
δ
1− δ (2
∫ x+
x
c(− (y − x)) dy + (b− c)) (1.18)
Solving (1.18) yields
 =
−c(1− δ) +√(1− δ)(c2(1− δ) + 4bδ)
2cδ
where  > 0. To avoid the problem of having an -interval that wraps more than once
around the circle, I impose the condition that  ≤ 1
2
, as stated in the proposition.
Now, I complete the proof by showing that  > 0.
 > 0
⇐⇒ −c(1−δ)+
√
(1−δ)(c2(1−δ)+4bδ)
2cδ
> 0
⇐⇒ −c(1− δ) +√(1− δ)(c2(1− δ) + 4bδ) > 0
⇐⇒ c2(1− δ)2 + 4bδ(1− δ) > c2(1− δ)2
⇐⇒ 4bδ(1− δ) > 0
⇐⇒ b > 0 which is always true.
Also note that  is also always a real number, since the term underneath the square
root is positive ⇐⇒ b > −c2(1−δ)
4δ
, which is always true since b > 0.
Proposition (2)
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Proof. The strategy for player x is determined by his or her optimization problem
in (1.2). Cx does not depend on the type of agent y but his discounted matching
utility u
x(y)
1−δ strictly decreases in the distance between x and y. This being, there
must be a threshold type y¯ for which x is indifferent between dating and not. This
type y¯ must define a threshold strategy for x.
Proposition (3)
Proof. Taking derivatives gives
∂
∂b
=
1− δ√
c(δ − 1)(c(δ − 1)− 4bδ) > 0
∂
∂c
=
−b(1− δ)√
c(δ − 1)(c(δ − 1)− 4bδ) < 0
∂
∂δ
=
c(δ−1)−2bδ+
√
c(δ−1)(c(δ−1)−4bδ)
2δ2
√
c(δ−1)(c(δ−1)−4bδ) < 0
⇐⇒ c(δ − 1)− 2bδ +√c(δ − 1)(c(δ − 1)− 4bδ) < 0
⇐⇒ √c(δ − 1)(c(δ − 1)− 4bδ) < 2bδ − c(δ − 1)
⇐⇒ c(δ − 1)(c(δ − 1)− 4bδ) < 4b2δ2 − 4bδc(δ − 1) + c2(δ − 1)2
⇐⇒ −4bcδ(δ − 1) < 4b2δ2 − 4bδc(δ − 1)
⇐⇒ 4b2δ2 > 0 which is always true since b, δ > 0
Proposition (5)
Proof. The proof of this proposition follows exactly as the proof for Proposition 2
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did, with the exception that the expected continuation value incorporates the per-
interaction price p¯. Thus the indifference condition for all agents is the following
equation
ux(y¯)
(1− δ) = δ(
∫ 1
0
V (y) dy − p¯)
We may then repeat the steps done in Proposition 2 to obtain the . In particular,
we note that since
 = min{1
2
,
c(δ − 1) +√c(δ − 1)(c(δ − 1)− 4δ(b+ p¯δ))
2cδ
}
we have that  ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ p¯ ≥ −α
δ
and p¯ is a real number ⇐⇒ (pi(δ−1)−2δ(α+p¯δ)) ≤
0 ⇐⇒ p¯ ≥ δ(pi−2α)−pi
2δ2
. Since −α
δ
≥ δ(pi−2α)−pi
2δ2
, we have that the condition that p¯ ≥ −α
δ
ensures that  ∈ R+.
Proposition (6)
Proof. Taking derivatives of  gives
∂
∂p
=
δ(1− δ)√
c(δ − 1)(c(δ − 1)− 4δ(b+ pδ)) ≥ 0
∂
∂b
=
1− δ√
c(δ − 1)(c(δ − 1)− 4δ(b+ pδ)) ≥ 0
∂
∂δ
=
c(δ − 1)− 2δ(b+ pδ2) +√c(δ − 1)(c(δ − 1)− 4δ(b+ pδ))
2δ2
√
c(δ − 1)(c(δ − 1)− 4δ(b+ pδ)) ≤ 0
∂
∂c
=
−(1− δ)(b+ pδ)√
c(δ − 1)(c(δ − 1)− 4δ(b+ pδ)) ≤ 0
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Proposition (7)
Proof. It is easy to see from (1.15) that Πss is linear in i, and so i would optimally
be set to be 1. To see the second point, refer to the argument made for the case for
one type of agents in the next chapter.
Proposition (8)
Proof. 1 is proven from the previous proposition. Next, I set out to prove 2. Since
types are observable, the firm has two pricing tools to extract all surplus from agents.
The firm can extract all this surplus using a combination of p and f . In particular,
for any p that the monopolist chooses, since C is a function of p, f will just be set
so that C(p) = f . This is precisely the entire amount of surplus that agents can
extract. To prove 3, note that I am focusing on steady-state equilibrium. Combining
the steady-state conditions from (1.13) gives 3. To prove 4, we reiterate the steps
from Proposition 4.
Given the price f charged by the monopolist, it is clear that all agents will
participate. The mass of agents who participate will be determined by the steady-
state condition in (1.8). What needs to proven now is whether all of the agents will
find a match. Since agents are uniformly distributed, they are essential identical
and have the same . Since the distribution of agents on both sides is uniform, the
probability of finding a match is given by
P (finding a match) =
2
1
= 2
Since each period is identical and independent, the probability that an agent has yet
to find a match by time T is
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P (not found a match by time T ) =
T∏
t=1
P (not found a match) = (1− 2)T
As T →∞, we have that P (not found a match by time T )→ 0, since 2 ≤ 1.
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Chapter 2
Pricing and Matching with Vertical Types
2.1 Introduction
The study of two-sided markets has gained momentum in recent years. A two-sided
market is a market where agents are brought together by a platform or network.
The platform is segmented into two ‘sides’, where it is assumed that the two sides
face some level of difficulty in coming together without the help of the platform.
Some examples of real-life two-sided markets include the credit card market (the two
sides being consumers and merchants), software platforms (developers and users),
and business-to-business websites that bring wholesalers and manufacturers together
like the Chinese platform Alibaba.com. Agents who join this type of market typi-
cally exert some type of externality onto each other, which brings about interesting
dynamics on the platform. This paper attempts to study the effects of externalities
on a two-sided matching platform on pricing. This has also been studied in other pa-
pers such as Armstrong (2006). He studied three main pricing structures: monopoly
platforms, competing platforms where agents join a single platform (single-home),
and ‘competitive bottlenecks’ where one group of agents joins all platforms (multi-
homes). Heterogeneity amongst agents is also commonly studied in the literature.
For example, Weyl (2010) models a two-sided platform with prices and agents who
differ in income. In his paper, he provides a measure of market power in order to
study policy questions regarding price regulations and platform mergers.
An important incorporation into the two-sided platform literature is the search
aspect. Agents on both sides of the market can search for matches with agents
on the opposite side, and do so in a way that maximizes their expected utility
while on the platform. For example, in the heterosexual marriage or dating market,
agents search for the best partners they can obtain.1 Two-sided matching platforms
traditionally do not involve prices. For example, two popular applications of the
study of matching platforms are the kidney exchange market (Roth, So¨nmez, and
U¨nver (2005), Roth, So¨nmez, and U¨nver (2007)) and student-to-school matchings in
American cities (Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, and Roth (2005), Abdulkadirog˘lu et al.
(2005)). This of course, has an exception: the worker-firm market has been studied
extensively in the labor economics literature where, as in Bulow and Levin (2006),
wages are taken as prices.
This essay models how a profit-maximizing monopolist firm would price services
on a platform where vertically differentiated agents pay to search for matches. It
combines two well-established literatures by embedding a pricing model into the Mc-
Call (1970) search and matching framework. In my model, there are two types of
agents: H types (the studs) and L types (the duds). Everyone on the platform
universally agree on the ranking of the agents—H types are strictly preferred to L
types. I allow for an element of randomness in the matching process. In particu-
lar, agents are assumed to obtain their match’s vertical type plus a random shock
when they match. This random shock ψ can be seen as a way to model horizontal
differentiation when matching. I assume that this matching shock is the same for
both agents. This complication in my model introduces the possibility for a more
realistic matching model since it incorporates a less rigid matching utility structure.
In particular, two studs may not match with each other if they receive a very bad
random draw during their date. This utility specification also allows me to study a
1In such markets, such as the one studied in the paper, it is often assumed that both agents
must agree for a match to form. Thus, the “best” partner for an individual may be of much lower
quality that the individual may like.
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world where the match quality can be neatly decomposed into two effects: vertical
and horizontal.
The main contribution of this essay is to study how externalities affect pricing
on a two-sided matching platform, an issue that is understudied in the literature.
The only other paper that studies externalities and how they affect matching is
Shimer and Smith (2001), where they highlight two externalities: the thick-market
externality and the congestion externality. The thick-market externality stems from
the fact that studs do not internalize the fact that if they marry and leave the
platform, they make it harder for other agents on the platform to meet them. The
congestion externality can be seen when studs never match with duds, which creates
a ‘congestion’ problem for the duds who pay the cost of having to go on many dates
with people who are not willing to marry them. I find these two externalities in my
paper as well, as highlighted in my numerical example in Section 2.5.
It is also important to note that the literature has yet to study a world where
agents choose to match on both a vertical and horizontal component. This paper
simultaneously studies such a market and also incorporates pricing into it. I have
found a unique externality in this paper, which is that agents tend to match too
aggressively on the vertical component and not aggressive enough on the horizontal
component. In particular, since all agents agree on the quality of the vertical compo-
nent, there is a negative externality imposed on all other agents on the market when
one agent successfully marries the studs and take him or her away from the mar-
ket. This externality is not present in the horizontal matching component, where an
agent does not take away from another agent’s ability to receive a good idiosyncratic
matching shock draw if she receives one.
The second element that separates this model from others is that agents have
preferences over the proportion of H types on the platform, α. This variable is
determined in steady-state and will be also be a function of prices. The main com-
plexity involved in analyzing this model stems from a fixed problem problem. In
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particular, the the choice of prices affect the agents’ optimization problems, which in
turn affects α, which agents take as given when making their optimization decisions.
As we will see later, studs always benefit from an increase in α; that is, studs are
always happier when there are more other studs on the platform. However, this may
not be true for duds. In particular, if the parameterization is such that studs never
marry duds, duds may be negatively effected by an increase in the number of studs
on the platform.
The matching framework that I utilize is one where utility is non-transferable
and matching is ‘random’, which means that agents receive random draws of a date
while on the platform. The draw is such that you meet an H type with probability
α and L with probability 1−α. Non-transferable utility means that an agent cannot
induce another agent to match with him or her by offering some utility or transfer
as a reward. This is in contrast to transferable utility, where agents may bargain
over the matching surplus. In an ideal world, modeling the marriage and dating
market would require incorporating a partial transferable utility model, where a
portion of the match surplus is fixed and the rest is up for bargaining between the
two agents. However, this adds a significant level of mathematical complexity to
the model. Previous papers in the literature have chosen to either model utility as
being transferable or non-transferable. According to American cultural norms and
observations from real-life and the world of online dating, one cannot usually obtain
a match by paying off the other person on a date. Thus, I assert that my assumption
of non-transferable utility is realistic.
Before proceeding, I would again like to highlight the fact that externalities play
a very important role in this paper. The main externality in the model stems from
the fact that agents care about the vertical type of their partners. Regardless of their
idiosyncratic matching shock, agents have an incentive to always wait to meet a stud.
This is obviously privately optimal, but is not socially optimal. In the case where
types are perfectly observable, the firm acts as a social planner. This means that
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the firm will want to correct any externalities and deviations from social optimality.
It does so in my model by using the only (imperfect) instrument available to them,
which is the per-interaction price. Another externality stems from the fact that
everyone dislikes duds. Having more duds on the platform decreases α, which in
turns decreases the utility of the studs. This is suboptimal from the point of view
of the firm since it cares most about the studs, who have more utility (and thus,
surplus) to be extracted. As we shall see in the paper, the efficient level for per-
interaction prices is zero. In the case where the firm wants to correct externalities,
it may charge high positive per-interaction prices to duds to increase their cost of
being on the platform and encourage them to marry faster, and may charge negative
prices to studs to encourage them to take longer to marry in order to improve the
attractiveness of the platform.
Now, I would like to highlight and elaborate on four interesting features of my
model. The first is one that connects the role of the profit-maximizing monopolist
to the traditional matching literature. Recall that utility is non-transferable in my
model. As I have previously explained, in the case where types are perfectly observ-
able, the monopolist problem is equivalent to a social planner’s problem, where the
objective is to maximize the total surplus in the economy. In this case, the monop-
olist operates as a social planner who maximizes the total expected utility of agents
on the platform, only to extract it all using prices.
Proposition 9 (Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss (2014)) Suppose utility is trans-
ferable. A stable assignment must maximize total surplus over all possible assign-
ments.
Proposition 9 then tells us that in the case where utility is transferable, a stable
assignment, which corresponds to the steady-state equilibrium in my model, must
maximize total surplus. In other words, in the case where types are perfectly observ-
able, the monopolist charges prices to essentially reallocate surplus amongst agents
as though utility were transferable. By maximizing total surplus, the monopolist in
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my model shifts the allocation of utility amongst agents from being non-transferable
to utility being transferable.
The second feature of the model concerns the horizontal differentiation ‘shock’
parameter. In the matching literature, types are usually either assumed to be hori-
zontal or vertical, but not both. As previously explained, in allowing for a horizontal
differentiation component, I am able to a model a more realistic version of reality,
where agents may care about multiple components of a characteristic when look-
ing for a match. In the previous essay of this dissertation, I have explored the
pricing equilibrium for a model where agents are purely horizontally differentiated,
with characteristics distributed uniformly on the unit circle. It turns out that the
horizontal differentiation component utilized in this paper can be rationalized by
preferences on the Salop circle described in Salop (1979) as well. In particular, for
any distribution function F of agents on the Salop circle, I can choose the cost of
matching away from an ideal type so that the matching shock ψ in my model is
distributed according to F . This provides a nice bridge connecting the first essay of
this dissertation with this one, and also strengthens the connection between models
of pure horizontal differentiation with mine.
The third feature is regarding the role of the platform as a match-maker. As
will be apparent later in the paper, all agents in my model, regardless of type,
have the same outside option. This is an assumption that is clearly unrealistic, as
one may think of the studs as having better options of matching than the duds,
regardless of whether they are searching on or off the platform. This assumption,
however, is extremely crucial to aid in the tractability of the model. To rationalize
the importance of the platform as a match-making network, I assume that the firm
has significantly better matching technology than what is available to agents whilst
searching in the general population. While on the platform, the agents obtain a
random draw of a date in each period versus having infrequent random draws of
matches while searching off-platform. This interpretation provides legitimacy to the
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function of the matching platform.
The last feature of the model is related to aggregation. In real-life, we observe that
agents may match on many dimensions of characteristics; for example, I may have
horizontal preferences over height and weight for a match, and a vertical preference
for wealth. In other words, my ideal match may be somebody who is not only close
to me in physical size, but also the richest in the world. In my model, I assume
an aggregation of preferences, since agents are only allowed to have preferences over
a single vertical and horizontal dimension. However, a result from Flanders (2014)
gives that aggregating N vertical and horizontal dimensions into a single dimension
results in the same matching outcome and profit for the firm. Thus, my assumption
of agents only matching on a single dimension is not limiting.
The outline of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 first reviews the literature.
Section 3 provides the model setup. In Section 4, I explore the pricing equilibrium
for a baseline model in which there are no externalities; that is, when there is only
one type of agent. Section 5 explores the more general case with two types in depth.
It is divided into three subsections. The first studies the case where the monopolist
firm is able to operate two distinct platforms, each catering only to agents of the
same type. The second subsection studies the case when the firm cannot do so
and only operates one platform, and when types are perfectly observable. In this
subsection, I first outline the monopolist’s problem and then explore four cases of
the distributional assumptions for the idiosyncratic matching shock ψ. In particular,
Case I looks at when there are no to small idiosyncratic matching shocks, Case II
looks at when ψ is uniformly distributed on [0,m], Case III looks at when ψ is
distributed according to a two-point mass distribution, and Case IV looks at when
ψ is distributed according to any smooth distribution function. I provide analytical
results for Cases I, II, and IV, and provide numerical simulations for Cases II and
III. One fact to point out is that the cases are not mutually exclusive. For example,
Case II is a subset of Case IV. Finally, the third subsection explores the situation
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when the monopolist firm operates only one platform and types are not observable.
Section 6 then concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
This paper combines three literatures: search, matching, and pricing, The matching
literature can be traced back to the seminal paper by Gale and Shapley (1962).
Many papers in the literature have since focused on proving equilibrium properties
of specific matching functions. In particular, a lot of attention has been paid to two
classes of utility functions: transferable and not. Utility is said to be transferable
when an agent can offer a certain amount of utility to another agent to match with
her. In particular, agents may bargain over the resulting match surplus. Utility
is non-transferable when this is not the case. My paper focuses on the case when
utility is non-transferable. Another issue of interest when studying matching models
is assortation. Positive assortation in equilibrium implies that high types match
with other correspondingly high types, whereas negative asportation means that
high types match with low types. Assuming nontransferable utility, Becker (1973)
proved conditions under which positive assortation occurs. Although my paper does
not address the issue of assortation explicitly, I do find ‘separating’ steady-state
equilibrium where studs (high types) only match with other studs and do not match
with low types. As in many other matching papers, I also assume that matching
is random, exogenous, and non-targeted. Agents in matching models can either be
horizontally or vertically differentiated. Horizontal differentiation models assume
that an agent wants to match with another agent whose type is closest to their own
whereas vertical differentiation models have agents whose types can be represented
as quality, where the ranking of types (quality) is agreed upon by all individuals in
the model.
One of the most elegant models of matching with vertically-differentiated types
is Burdett and Coles (1997). In this model, agent characteristics are summarized
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into a single number, defined as agent’s pizazz, and takes a value in the interval
[0, 1]. Burdett and Coles analyze the matching equilibrium by studying steady-state
conditions and find a rich set of equilibria. Agents match in assortative partitions
in equilibrium, where the interval [0, 1] for both types of agents is broken up into
distinct pieces with agents in the same piece matching randomly with each other. In
the third subsection of section 5, I will elaborate on modeling difficulties that result
from the case when types are unobservable in my paper and expand on some of my
planned future work that involves extending Burdett and Coles (1997) to include
lying and pricing.
The search literature, on the other hand, started with the study of job search in
the labor market (McCall (1970), Burdett (1978), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994),
Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005)). It has since expanded to include other appli-
cations as well, including the marriage and dating market (e.g. Cornelius (2003)). As
highlighted in the introduction, applications of search theory to the dating market
usually assumes non-transferable utility, as this mirrors real-life more closely than
the assumption of transferable utility. In particular, Burdett and Wright (1998)
and Adachi (2003) both study properties of equilibria in a search models with non-
transferable utility.
Finally, this paper incorporates pricing theory in a world with externalities and
a profit-maximizing monopolist. I study two cases: the first is when the monopolist
can only operate one platform (perhaps due to high fixed or operating costs), and the
second is when monopolist has the ability to operate two platforms that cater to the
different types. This is in contrast to Rocher and Tirole (2010), who study platform
competition with two-sided markets. Pricing in search markets has also been studied
by other authors (e.g. Bester (1994)) in the context of a buyer-seller relationship
where buyers are looking to buy a good from a price-posting seller. However, models
such as Bester (1994) do not have the complexity of network externalities which
affect agent’s optimal matching behavior in equilibrium, as in my model.
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The closest paper to this is Bloch and Ryder (2000), where they study the pro-
vision of matching services in a model of two-sided search. Agents are distributed
on the unit interval and their utility is equal to the index of their mate. Bloch and
Ryder (2000) find that in a search equilibrium, agents form subintervals and are only
matches to agents inside their own class, a result that closely mirrors that of Burdett
and Coles (1997). The two main differences between my paper and theirs is my
inclusion of the ψ and the fact that I assume that the monopolist utilizes a two-part
tariff pricing structure. I am primarily interested in the signs of the per-interaction
prices–be it positive, the ‘efficient’ (or, as we see later, the ‘no externalities’) level
of 0, or even negative. Bloch and Ryder (2000), on the other hand, study how two
separate pricing structures (uniform and commissions on the matching surplus) af-
fect equilibrium behavior in agents. A similar paper is Damiano and Li (2007). In
this model, the monopolist again faces two sides of the market with each side having
characteristics distributed on a compact interval. The monopolist is able to choose
a sorting and pricing structure in order to maximize revenue. They then show that
the revenue-maximizing sorting is efficient.
2.3 Model
2.3.1 Environment
This is an infinite-horizon model with a sole profit-maximizing monopolist firm op-
erating a matching platform which caters to two sides of the market. For ease of
exposition, consider this to be a heterosexual online dating website that caters to
men and women. Each side consists of two types of agents, High and Low (abbre-
viated H and L). Time is discrete and both agents and the firm discount at the
same rate δ. I will be focusing on a steady-state equilibrium, which is defined by
equating the total inflow into the platform with the total outflow out of the platform.
Using these steady-state conditions on inflows and outflows allows me to solve for
40
the distribution of H types on the platform, α, that makes the mass of agents on the
platform constant.
I assume that firm can charge a two-part tariff2– a fixed price f which is charged
to all agents for access onto the platform and per-interaction (or per-date) price
p. Once agents are on the platform, they may begin searching for matches. They
pay p to receive a new date, and will meet a H with probability α and L with
probability 1 − α. As previously highlighted, this probability α is endogenous and
will be determined in equilibrium by using steady-state conditions.
Once the agents pay p, they will meet each other in the next period, learn each
others’ types, receive a matching shock ψ and decide whether or not to marry. If
both agents decide to marry, they do so forever. If one or both do not want to
marry, they will both continue searching by paying p in this period to continue to
the next period. The idiosyncratic shock ψ is drawn from a distribution on [0,m]
with cumulative distribution F and density function f . A intuitive interpretation
for ψ is given below.
The utility that an agent i receives when marrying agent j forever is a function
of the draw ψ and is given by
ui(ψ | j) = θj + ψ
1− δ (2.1)
There are two characteristics of the matching utility that I would like to elaborate
on. First of all, note that agents receive the other agent’s type as utility and not
their own. This also means that all agents in the model prefer the H type. Secondly,
note that the shock ψ is the same for all agents. I use ψ as a horizontal characteristic
2I have made a modeling choice to study only the case where the firm charges a two-part tariff.
The main reason is that this pricing structure is general and encapsulates other structures such as
uniform pricing. The second reason is that many real-life online dating websites (Ashley Madison,
Just For Lunch, etc.) charge either a fixed uniform price per month or a two-part tariff in which
individuals pay a certain amount for access onto the platform, and then pay a price to meet another
individual on the website or view their profile.
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‘proxy’. For example, if we assume that agents are either studs or duds, the shock
ψ may measure both agents’ love for the game show Wheel of Fortune, which is
revealed during the date. This matching utility of θj + ψ is obtained discounted by
a factor of 1
1−δ , since I assume that once agents marry, they leave the platform and
stay married forever.
2.3.2 Agent’s Problem
In each period, agents simply decide whether or not to match or continue searching
in the next round.
Definition 3 Define a strategy for type i as
si : [0, 1] × {L,H} → {accept, reject}
The interpretation for the strategy is that it takes the ψ-draw and type of the opposite
agent as arguments and returns a decision on whether or not to form a match. The
steady-state Bellman equation for type i conditional on meeting j is then
Vi(ψ | j) = max{θj + ψ
1− δ , δ(αVi(ψ | H) + (1− α)Vi(ψ | L))− pi} (2.2)
where I define the expected continuation utility of being on the platform as being
Ci ≡ δ(αVi(ψ | H) + (1− α)Vi(ψ | L))− pi
In making their optimization decision, agents take α and prices as given. In the
Bellman equation, agents are comparing the matching utility and the expected con-
tinuation utility of being on the platform. If agents continue searching, they must
pay p in this period in order to proceed to searching in the next period.
42
In studying the Bellman equation from (2.2), I first prove the existence of a value
function V (.) that makes (2.2) hold.
Proposition 10 Let X ⊂ R and
B ≡ {f : X → R : f is bounded and continuous}
The mapping T : B → B defined by (2.2) has a unique fixed point.
Note that the right-hand side of (2.2) is independent of the ψ draw and the left-hand
side is increasing in ψ. This implies that i’s optimal strategy takes the form of a
threshold strategy.
Definition 4 Agents optimally choose to match when the ψ draw is higher than a
threshold, and choose to continue searching otherwise. Formally,
s∗i (ψ, j) =
reject if ψ ≥ ψ
∗
i (j)
accept if ψ < ψ∗i (j)
(2.3)
There are then two thresholds for each agent of type i, ψ∗i = {ψ∗i (H), ψ∗i (L)}. The
optimal interior thresholds satisfy the followng equation
θH + ψ
∗
i (H)
1− δ =
θL + ψ
∗
i (L)
1− δ = Ci (2.4)
whereas the optimal corner thresholds are obtained when making comparisons be-
tween Ci and the matching utility. Now, I characterize the agent’s optimal thresholds
and expected continuation utilities. The characterization of the optimal thresholds
and expected continuation utilities will allow me to rank the relative positions of the
four thresholds. In particular, as we will soon see, the studs will be pickier when it
comes to matching. An agent i is said to be pickier in the matching process than
agent j if i’s threshold to date j is higher than that of j’s to match with her. The
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studs are naturally both pickier than duds to date anyone else and also picker when
it comes to dating duds than other studs.
Proposition 11 For any i ∈ {L,H}, ψ∗i (L) > ψ∗i (H) at the interior.
The previous proposition informs us that any fixed type of an agent is pickier
about dating duds than studs. This is an easy consequence of studs being seen as
universally more attractive. In the next proposition, I study the relative between the
expected continuation utilities of the two types of agents.
Proposition 12 In a steady-state equilibrium, CH > CL.
Corollary 5 For all j ∈ {L,H}, ψ∗H(j) > ψ∗L(j)
From the above propositions, I can deduce that H always has the upper hand in
determining whether or not a match forms when two agents meet. This means that
we can reduce the set of thresholds to characterize. In particular, L’s threshold for
matching with H (ψ∗L(H)) is meaningless since the decision whether or not to marry
depends solely on ψ∗H(L). Thus, I now only have to characterize three thresholds:
ψ∗H(H), ψ
∗
H(L), ψ
∗
L(L).
The expected life continuation utilities CH and CL can be recursively expressed.
It may be easier to expand Ci ∀i ∈ {H,L} in order to see how it depends on the
thresholds. I first rewrite CH . With probability α, an H agent will meet another
H agent. There are then two cases for the random draw ψ—it is either higher than
the threshold ψ∗H(H), in which case the two H agents marry, or it is lower than
the threshold ψ∗H(H), in which case the H types will continue searching and obtain
their expected continuation utility of being on the platform, CH . Similarly, with
probability 1− α, an H agent meets a L agent. In the case where the random draw
ψ is higher than the threshold ψ∗H(L), H will marry the L agent. When the draw
is not high enough, H will continue searching and obtain CH . Since the H agent
pays a price pH to continue to the next period, I subtract this term from the end of
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the right-hand side of the equation. The entire utility is also discounted by δ. This
results in the following expression for CH .
CH = αδ[
∫ ψ∗H(H)
−a
CH f(ψ) dψ +
∫ a
ψ∗H(H)
θH + ψ
(1− δ) f(ψ) dψ]
+(1− α)δ[
∫ ψ∗H(L)
−a
CH f(ψ) dψ +
∫ a
ψ∗H(L)
θL + ψ
(1− δ) f(ψ) dψ]− pH
=⇒ CH = δ[αE(uH,H | match) + (1− α)E(uH,L | match)]− pH
1− δ[αF (ψ∗H(H)) + (1− α)F (ψ∗H(L))]
(2.5)
where
E(uH,H | match) =
∫ a
ψ∗H(H)
θH + ψ
(1− δ) f(ψ) dψ
and
E(uH,L | match) =
∫ a
ψ∗H(L)
θL + ψ
(1− δ) f(ψ) dψ
Similarly, I can rewrite CL. As before, with probability α, L meets an H type. Recall
that studs always have the upper hand in the matching process. This means that in
the scenario where L meets H, the relevant threshold will be ψ∗H(L) and not ψ
∗
L(H).
In the case where the draw ψ is higher than the threshold ψ∗H(L), L will form a
match with H; and in the case where the draw is not high enough, L will have to
continue searching and obtain CL. Similar reasoning also holds for when L meets
another L with probability 1− α.
CL = αδ[
∫ ψ∗H(L)
−a
CL f(ψ) dψ +
∫ a
ψ∗H(L)
θH + ψ
(1− δ) f(ψ) dψ]
+(1− α)δ[
∫ ψ∗L(L)
−a
CL f(ψ) dψ +
∫ a
ψ∗L(L)
θL + ψ
(1− δ) f(ψ) dψ]− pL
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=⇒ CL = δ[αE(uL,H | match) + (1− α)E(uL,L | match)]− pL
1− δ[αF (ψ∗H(L)) + (1− α)F (ψ∗L(L))]
(2.6)
where
E(uL,H | match) =
∫ a
ψ∗H(L)
θH + ψ
(1− δ) f(ψ) dψ
and
E(uL,L | match) =
∫ a
ψ∗L(L)
θL + ψ
(1− δ) f(ψ) dψ
Obtaining simpler forms from the recursive formulations of both CH and CL allow
me to prove some comparative statics relating to the expression in (2.5) and (2.6).
An important note to make is that the following proposition holds α fixed. In
equilibrium, however, α is not fixed and determined endogenously. This is because
of the previously mentioned fixed point problem: α affects the thresholds, which then
in turn affect α. However, it is useful to have the comparative statics by holding α
constant, since the agents themselves take α as constant when they optimize.
Proposition 13 For distributions with continuous support, in a steady-state equi-
librium the following is true:
1. All thresholds strictly decrease with prices.
2. All thresholds strictly increase with δ.
3. ∂CH
∂α
> 0
4.
∂ψ∗H(H)
∂α
> 0,
∂ψ∗H(L)
∂α
> 0
The first result is that thresholds strictly decrease with prices. This means that
higher per-interaction prices cause agents to become less picky since the cost of
searching on the platform has now increased. A higher δ, which corresponds to more
patient agents, causes agents to become less picky. All else equal, agents are now
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content with staying on the platform and waiting for longer to obtain a better match
and random draw ψ. The last two results of the previous proposition relate to the
behavior of the studs when the proportion of the H types, α, changes. In particular,
the results show that studs are both better off and pickier when there are more
studs on the platform. This is not a surprising result since studs are seen as the
superior type by everyone on the platform. I am not able to prove similar results
relating to how the optimal strategy of the L type changes with respect to changes
in the proportion of studs on the platform. This is because this result would depend
strongly on whether or not H types are willing to match to L types. In particular,
one can easily imagine a situation where H types are significantly better than L
types (i.e. θH − θL is very large), in which case H types would never match to L
types. This situation would cause L types to be much worse off in the presence of
many H types. In particular, the value of the platform as a means to obtain a match
decreases to the L types–he is not able to increase his odds of obtaining a match by
joining a platform in which the vast majority of others on the platform do not wish
to match to him.
2.3.3 Dynamics
I will be focusing on steady-state equilibrium in this essay. To do so, I introduce
the dynamics in the model. Denote types by τ ∈ {H,L}. In each period t, there is
an exogenous mass of size 1 of both types of agents deciding whether or not to join
the platform. A proportion iτ,t of agents τ join the platform at time t. While this
is happening, there is also a mass of agents of each type already on the platform.
Denote this mass of agents as µτ,t. A proportion oτ,t of agents of type τ choose
to form matches and leave the platform forever in period t. I can then state the
transitional equation for µτ,t, which is the following
µτ,t+1 = (1− oτ,t)µτ,t + iτ,t (2.7)
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At each period t, we have agents both exiting and entering the platform. A proportion
iτ,t of the mass of size 1 of agents who are born are let into the platform, which makes
the inflow into the platform iτ,t. From the total mass of agents on the platform, a
proportion oτ,t leave, leaving (1 − oτ,t)µτ,t agents on the platform. Adding this up
gives the equation in (2.7).
Recall now that α is the proportion of H agents on the platform. The outflows
for each type can be found by calculating the probability of matching. Thus, in
equilibrium,
oH(α, pH) = α(1− F (ψ∗H(H))) + (1− α)(1− F (ψ∗H(L)))
and
oL(α, pH , pL) = α(1− F (ψ∗H(L))) + (1− α)(1− F (ψ∗L(L)))
The outflow for H depends on the prices for H, since H types determine whether or
not a match forms. With probability α, H meets another H and a match forms if
and only if the ψ-draw is greater than the threshold, which occurs with probability
(1 − F (ψ∗H(H))). Similarly when H meets an L. For the L type, the probability of
matching depends on both pH and pL. This is because L takes the threshold ψ
∗
H(L)
as given when matching. Now, I am ready to define a steady-state. The steady-state
will determine the value for α.
Definition 6 A steady state consists of inflows, outflows, and constant distributions
of agents {µH , µL} on the platform. It is characterized by the following equations:
iH = oHµH (2.8)
iL = oLµL (2.9)
µτ = (1− oτ )µτ + iτ ∀τ ∈ {L,H} (2.10)
The proportion of H types on the platform, α, can then be solved for from the
48
steady-state equations.3
α =
µH
µH + µL
=
iH
oH
iH
oH
+ iL
oL
(2.11)
Rewriting the equation for α as a function of the firm’s choice variables, we have
α(pH , pL) =
iH
oH(pH)
iH
oH(pH)
+ iL
oL(pL)
=
iHoL(pH , pL)
(iHoL(pH , pL) + iLoH(pH))
(2.12)
There are some intuitive propositionerties of α that are worth highlighting. First of
all, note that α becomes smaller with a higher oL. As L types leave the platform
faster, the proportion of H types on the platform will increase. Similar, the quicker H
types leave the platform, the lower α becomes since oH has increased. This analysis
can also be conducted on the proportion of agents that are let into the platform: as
iH increases, α increases; and as more L types enter, the lower the proportion of H
types on the platform becomes.
In particular, note that the equation in (2.12) can be rewritten in a fixed point
form as
α(pH , pL) = f(α(pH , pL)) (2.13)
Given a set of prices pH , pL set by the monopolist and a distribution function for ψ,
the right-hand side in (2.13) will be determined and α can then be solved for. In
general, even with very simple distribution functions such as the uniform distribution,
the closed form expression for α is incredibly complicated. In fact, α may not be able
to be solved analytically for more general distribution functions. This is undoubtedly
a big hurdle in obtaining analytical results for the model and will be discussed more
in the conclusion to this essay.
3Note that solving for α in 2.12 only holds for when α is interior. In the case where the firm
does not let any L types onto the platform, the proportion of studs is obviously 1. Similarly, in the
case where there are no studs on the platform, α = 0. The latter case is not of interest to me since
if iH = 0, then iL = 0 and I am left with a trivial equilibrium where nobody joins the platform.
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2.4 Baseline: Model With No Externalities
Consider now the baseline model where there are no externalities ; in other words, a
world where there is only one type of agent. Assume also that types are perfectly
observable. This model with no externalities provide a baseline for the more com-
plicated model later on, where externalities are introduced through the α term. To
solve for the steady-state equilibrium, note that in the case where types are perfectly
observable, the monopolist acts a social planner who maximizes total surplus in the
economy. In particular, the monopolist will set prices to maximize the agent’s ex-
pected discounted utility of being on the platform. Now, note that the only way
prices affect the agent’s problem in the case with no externalities is through the
agent’s threshold ψ∗. For ease of exposition, write the expected discounted utility of
agents as
EU ≡ U(ψ∗)− f − pD(ψ∗)
where U is the matching utility, D is the expected number of dates the agent goes on
before leaving the platform, p is the per-interaction price charged by the platform,
and f is the fixed price. Recognizing that prices affect the threshold ψ∗, I take
first-order conditions with respect to ψ∗ to obtain
∂EU
∂ψ∗ = 0 =⇒
∂U(ψ∗)
∂ψ
= p
∂D(ψ∗)
∂ψ∗ =⇒ p = 0
Now, note that the monopolist profit function is given by
Π = 2{if +
∞∑
t=0
δt+1ip(1− o)t} (2.14)
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The profit function linearly increases in i, which implies that the monopolist opti-
mally sets i = 1.4 This fully characterizes the solution to the monopolist’s optimiza-
tion problem for the case where there are no externalities.
Proposition 14 In the model with no externalities and a differentiable F , the mo-
nopolist optimally sets per-interaction fees to be zero, lets all agents in, and sets the
fixed fee to extract all remaining surplus.
This result provides a benchmark for the case where there are no distortions
caused by externalities imposed by different types of agents on each other. In par-
ticular, the firm in acting as a social planner does not have to correct the matching
behavior of agents on the platform by charging a non-zero per-interaction price since
agent’s optimality conditions are already aligned with those of society.
2.5 Model With Externalities
Consider now a model where there are two types of agents, namely the studs (H
types) and the duds (L types). I will analyze two different cases—one in which the
firm is able to separate the two types of agents into different platforms and another
where the firm is not able to separate the two types of agents into distinct platforms.
I will study the second case under both observable and unobservable types.
The firm may not be able to separate the two types of agents due to a variety
of reasons. For example, an online dating firm may specialize and operate only a
single website, focusing on aggressively advertising and managing the website. The
firm may also face high fixed and operating costs to operate more than one website,
or may be faced with legal constraints that prevent them from segregating the two
types.
4Please refer to footnote 6 from the previous chapter on my elaboration on the form of the profit
function.
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Another explanation as to why there could be two different platform configura-
tions may simply be because of the matching technology employed by the firm. To
further illustrate this idea, consider the real-life online dating platform eHarmony.
This dating platform operates with a different matching technology than other online
dating platforms such as Match. The reason that eHarmony is different than Match
because eHarmony makes all of their users undergo a ‘personality quiz’ in which
the users answer a long list of questions designed to extract information about their
characteristics and essentially, type. eHarmony then able to isolate a high type from
a low one, and limit the user’s choice set by only offering them access to agents who
are similar to themselves in types. Abstracting away from these details, I can model
this as a two-platform model where the firm fully observes the types of all agents
and splits the population into two separate platforms that cater to specific types.
This is in contrast to the matching technology employed by Match, where the
website does not try and extract more information about the types of the agents on
the platform. In particular, the firm allows agents to match freely with anyone while
on the platform. The question now is whether or not the monopolist would in fact,
in the case where they are able to, operate two platforms instead of one. The answer
to this question is yes, under some unrestrictive assumptions on the distribution
function F (.) of the idiosyncratic match shock ψ. This result is intuitive but not
trivial. In particular, the analysis is complicated by the fact that the two platform
configurations could have different outflow rates associated with the agents leaving
the platforms, and the fact that the proportion of studs on the platform, α, enters the
analysis for the one platform type. My result proves that under this model setup and
assuming perfectly observable types, the monopolist does strictly better by splitting
the types into separate platforms following the strategy of eHarmony than operating
one platform like Match and letting all types freely search and match.
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2.5.1 Firm has the Ability to Operate Two Platforms
Proposition 15 Suppose ψ is distributed according to a differentiable function F (.)
with continuous and bounded support. The monopolist profit is higher in the case
where two platforms are operated (each catering to only one type) than when only
one platform is operated.
Proof. Fix α, iH , iL, and all the parameters in the model. In the one platform
case, there are three thresholds of interest: ψ∗H(L), ψ
∗
L(L), and ψ
∗
H(H). All three
thresholds are functions of α, which is the proportion of studs on the platform.
In the two platform case there are only two thresholds of interest, one for each of
the platforms. I define these two thresholds to be ψ∗H and ψ
∗
L. In particular, in
the separate platforms case the studs only need to worry about their thresholds to
marry another studs, and the same goes for the duds. To simplify the analysis, I
equalize the outflow rates for both types on both configurations of platforms. There
are two main reasons for doing so. The first is to make the problem tractable by
simplifying the calculations done later in the proof. The second is because I would
like to utilize optimality conditions to aid in the proof. To see this, consider the
outflows for the one platform case that are a result of the optimal pricing strategy
of the firm and consider an arbitrary pricing strategy for the two platform case that
gives outflows for both types exactly equal to that of the one platform case. If I
can show that even under this arbitrary pricing strategy the monopolist profit for
operating two separate platforms is higher than that of operating a single platform,
then optimality conditions dictate that the optimal pricing strategy for operating
two separate platforms will necessarily do at least as well.
Now, recall that the outflow rate for H types while on the mixed platform is
oH,one platform = α(1− F (ψ∗H(H))) + (1− α)(1− F (ψ∗H(L)))
= 1− αF (ψ∗H(H)) + (1− α)F (ψ∗H(L))
Similarly, the outflow rate for L types while on the mixed platform is
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oL,one platform = α(1− F (ψ∗H(L))) + (1− α)(1− F (ψ∗L(L)))
= 1− αF (ψ∗H(L)) + (1− α)F (ψ∗L(L))
The outflow rates for the H and L platforms are defined, respectively, as
oH,two platforms = 1− F (ψ∗H)
oL,two platforms = 1− F (ψ∗L)
Setting oH,two platforms = oH,one platform and oL,two platforms = oL,one platform gives the fol-
lowing two relationships between the thresholds of both platform configurations.
F (ψ∗H) = αF (ψ
∗
H(H)) + (1− α)F (ψ∗H(L)) (2.15)
F (ψ∗L) = αF (ψ
∗
H(L)) + (1− α)F (ψ∗L(L)) (2.16)
(2.31) then gives that ψ∗H(L) ≥ ψ∗H ≥ ψ∗H(H) and (2.32) gives ψ∗H(L) ≥ ψ∗L ≥ ψ∗L(L).
Now, I define the profit for H and L types when the monopolist only operates 1
platform. Without loss of generality, I assume that the support for ψ is [0,m].
ΠH,1 =
∞∑
t=0
δt(1− oH)t
(1− δ) iHoH
(
α
∫ m
ψ∗H(H)
(θH+ψ) f(ψ) dψ+(1−α)
∫ m
ψ∗H(L)
(θL+ψ) f(ψ) dψ
)
(2.17)
ΠL,1 =
∞∑
t=0
δt(1− oL)t
(1− δ) iLoL
(
α
∫ m
ψ∗H(L)
(θH+ψ) f(ψ) dψ+(1−α)
∫ m
ψ∗L(L)
(θL+ψ) f(ψ) dψ
)
(2.18)
Simplifying (2.33) gives
54
ΠH,1 =
oH
(
θH +
(
α
∫ m
ψ∗H(H)
(θH + ψ) f(ψ) dψ + (1− α)
∫ m
ψ∗H(L)
(θL + ψ) f(ψ) dψ
))
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− oH))
and doing the same for (2.34) gives
ΠL,1 =
oL
(
θL +
(
α
∫ m
ψ∗H(L)
(θH + ψ) f(ψ) dψ + (1− α)
∫ m
ψ∗L(L)
(θL + ψ) f(ψ) dψ
))
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− oL))
The profit functions for types H and L for the case when there are two separate
platforms is
ΠH,2 =
oH
(
θH +
∫ m
ψ∗H
ψ f(ψ) dψ
)
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− oH))
ΠL,2 =
oL
(
θL +
∫ m
ψ∗L
ψ f(ψ) dψ
)
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− oL))
To show that the monopolist can do better when he operates two platforms instead
of one, I must show that
ΠH,2 + ΠL,2 ≥ ΠH,1 + ΠL,1
To do this, I separately show that ΠH,2 ≥ ΠH,1 and ΠL,2 ≥ ΠL,1. I first prove
that ΠH,2 ≥ ΠH,1. Taking the differences between the profits under both platform
configurations gives
ΠH,2 − ΠH,1 = cH
(∫ m
ψ∗H
ψ f(ψ) dψ − α
∫ m
ψ∗H(H)
ψ f(ψ) dψ − (1− α)
∫ m
ψ∗H(L)
ψ f(ψ) dψ
)
where cH ≡ oH(1−δ)(1−δ(1−oH)) is a positive constant. Thus, I must now prove that∫ m
ψ∗H
ψ f(ψ) dψ − α
∫ m
ψ∗H(H)
ψ f(ψ) dψ − (1− α)
∫ m
ψ∗H(L)
ψ f(ψ) dψ ≥ 0
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Rearranging terms and using the fact that ψ∗H(L) ≥ ψ∗H ≥ ψ∗H(H) gives that this
condition reduces to
1
α
∫ ψ∗H(L)
ψ∗H
ψ f(ψ) dψ − 1
1− α
∫ ψ∗H
ψ∗H(H)
ψ f(ψ) dψ ≥ 0
Note now that the thresholds ψ∗H(H) and ψ
∗
H(L) are both functions of α. When
ψ∗H(L) = ψ
∗
H(H), the condition is automatically satisfied since both integrals will
be 0. Now I want to show that as the gap between the two thresholds ψ∗H(H) and
ψ∗H(L) increases, the condition still holds. To do this, for any value of α, fix ψ
∗
H(H).
By showing that the derivative of the right-hand side of the condition is increasing
in ψ∗H(L), I will have shown that the condition holds.
Rewriting the condition by holding ψ∗H(H) constant and varying ψ
∗
H as functions
of ψ∗H(L) gives me
1
α
∫ ψ∗H(L)
ψ∗H(ψ
∗
H(L))
ψ f(ψ) dψ − 1
1− α
∫ ψ∗H(ψ∗H(L))
ψ∗H(H)
ψ f(ψ) dψ ≥ 0
Taking the derivative of the left-hand side of the condition with respect to ψ∗H(L) by
using the Leibniz Rule gives
∂LHS
∂ψ∗H(L)
=
1
α
(∫ ψ∗H(L)
ψ∗H(ψ
∗
H(L))
0 dψ + ψ∗H(L) f(ψ
∗
H(L))× 1− ψ∗H f(ψ∗H)
∂ψ∗H(ψ
∗
H(L))
∂ψ∗H(L)
)
− 1
1− α
(∫ ψ∗H(ψ∗H(L))
ψ∗H(H)
0 dψ + ψ∗H f(ψ
∗
H)
∂ψ∗H(ψ
∗
H(L))
∂ψ∗H(L)
− ψ∗H(H) f(ψ∗H(H))× 0
)
Recall that
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1− F (ψ∗H) = α(1− F (ψ∗H(H))) + (1− α)(1− F (ψ∗H(L)))
=⇒ F (ψ∗H) = αF (ψ∗H(H)) + (1− α)F (ψ∗H(L))
=⇒ ψ∗H = F−1(αF (ψ∗H(H)) + (1− α)F (ψ∗H(L)))
=⇒ ∂ψ∗H(ψ∗H(L))
∂ψ∗H(L)
=
(1−α)F ′ (ψ∗H(L))
F ′ (ψ∗H)
=⇒ ∂ψ∗H(ψ∗H(L))
∂ψ∗H(L)
=
(1−α)f(ψ∗H(L))
f(ψ∗H)
Substituting this into the earlier condition and simplifying gives
∂LHS
∂ψ∗H(L)
=
1
α
ψ∗H(L) f(ψ
∗
H(L))−
1
α
ψ∗H f(ψ
∗
H)
(1− α)f(ψ∗H(L))
f(ψ∗H)
− 1
(1− α)ψ
∗
H f(ψ
∗
H)
(1− α)f(ψ∗H(L))
f(ψ∗H)
which, when simplified, gives that
1
α
ψ∗H(L)f(ψ
∗
H(L))−
1
α
ψ∗Hf(ψ
∗
H(L))
=⇒ 1
α
f(ψ∗H(L))(ψ
∗
H(L)− ψ∗H) ≥ 0
where the last inequality is true since ψ∗H(L) ≥ ψ∗H . Thus, I have demonstrated that
ΠH,2 ≥ ΠH,1. Now, I move on to showing that ΠL,2 ≥ ΠL,1. First, note that
ΠL,2−ΠL,1 = cL
(∫ m
ψ∗L
ψ f(ψ)ψ−α
∫ m
ψ∗H(L)
ψ f(ψ) dψ− (1−α)
∫ m
ψ∗L(L)
ψ f(ψ) dψ
)
≥ 0
where cL =
oL
(1−δ)(1−δ(1−oL)) is a nonnegative constant. Using the fact that ψ
∗
H(L) ≥
ψ∗L ≥ ψ∗L(L) then reduces the condition to showing that
1
(1− α)
∫ ψ∗H(L)
ψ∗L
ψ f(ψ) dψ − 1
α
∫ ψ∗L
ψ∗L(L)
ψ f(ψ) dψ ≥ 0
As before, note that when ψ∗H(L) is exactly equal to ψ
∗
L(L), the condition trivially
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holds since both integrals will be 0. I now hold ψ∗L(L) fixed and vary ψ
∗
H(L). If I
can show that this condition holds when I vary ψ∗H(L), I will have shown that the
condition always holds true. To do this, I also assume that ψ∗L varies with ψ
∗
H(L).
Rewriting the condition then gives the following inequality
1
(1− α)
∫ ψ∗H(L)
ψ∗L(ψ
∗
H(L))
ψ f(ψ) dψ − 1
α
∫ ψ∗L(ψ∗H(L))
ψ∗L(L)
ψ f(ψ) dψ ≥ 0
Taking the derivatives of the left-hand side of this inequality with respect to ψ∗H(L)
by using the Leibniz Rule gives
∂LHS
∂ψ∗H(L)
=
1
(1− α)
(
ψ∗H(L) f(ψ
∗
H(L))− ψ∗Lf(ψ∗L)
∂ψ∗L(ψ
∗
H(L))
∂ψ∗H(L)
)
−
1
α
(
ψ∗Lf(ψ
∗
L)
∂ψ∗L(ψ
∗
H(L))
∂ψ∗H(L)
− ψ∗L(L)f(ψ∗L(L))
)
Using the fact that F (ψ∗L) = αF (ψ
∗
H(L)) + (1−α)F (ψ∗L(L)), I can then solve for ψ∗L
to find that
ψ∗L = F
−1(αF (ψ∗H(L)) + (1− α)F (ψ∗L(L)))
which in turn gives that
∂ψ∗L(ψ
∗
H(L))
∂ψ∗H(L)
=
αf(ψ∗H(L))
f(ψ∗L)
Substituting this derivative into the condition gives
∂LHS
∂ψ∗H(L)
=
1
1− αψ
∗
H(L)f(ψ
∗
H(L))−
1
1− αψ
∗
Lf(ψ
∗
L)
αf(ψ∗H(L))
f(ψ∗L)
− 1
α
ψ∗Lf(ψ
∗
L)
αf(ψ∗H(L))
f(ψ∗L)
+
1
α
ψ∗L(L)f(ψ
∗
L(L))
=⇒ ∂LHS
∂ψ∗H(L)
=
1
(1− α)(ψ
∗
H(L)− ψ∗L)f(ψ∗H(L)) +
1
α
ψ∗L(L)f(ψ
∗
L(L)) ≥ 0
where the last inequality holds since ψ has nonnegative support and ψ∗H(L) ≥ ψ∗L. I
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have thus demonstrated that ΠL,2 ≥ ΠL,1, which in turns implies that
Π2 = ΠH,2 + ΠL,2 ≥ ΠH,1 + ΠL,1 = Π1
In the next subsection, I consider the case where the profit-maximizing monopolist
is unable to separate the two types into distinct platforms. As stated previously, this
may be because the cost of doing so is too high or plainly due to the matching
technology employed by the firm (e.g. the online dating website Match). The last
important note regarding the previous proposition is the fact that it was proven by
fixing all the parameters in the model and also the endogenous α. The fact that the
monopolist does better when it operates two platforms rather than one for any value
of α then implies that it is optimal to operate two platforms under the equilibrium
value of α.
2.5.2 Firm Operates Only One Platform - Observable Types
In this subsection, I consider the case where the monopolist firm can perfectly observe
the types of the agents, be it H or L. Given how real online dating platforms work,
this is arguably a realistic setup. The reason is primarily due to the fact that many
online dating firms are usually able to extract enough information from the agents
on their types, be it through their self-proclaimed profiles on the website or through
an initial questionnaire. However, in reality, agents can still lie and misreport their
type. This will be addressed in more detail in the third subsection in this section,
when I study the case when types are unobservable.
In solving for equilibrium, I focus on four cases for the idiosyncratic matching
shock ψ. The first case is the basic case with no idiosyncratic shocks. I then extend
this to the case where the idiosyncratic matching shocks are sufficiently ‘small’; that
is when the shocks ψ are small relative to the size of the types θH and θL. In this
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case, I am able to explicitly solve for the steady-state equilibrium. The second case
that I study is when ψ is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,m]. In this case, I
obtain some partial equilibrium results and also run numerical simulations to solve
for a full steady-state equilibrium. In the third case, I look at when F is distributed
according to a two-point mass distribution; that is, ψ is either γ > 0 with probability
1− q or 0 with probability q. Here, I am not able to provide any analytical results,
but I provide numerical simulations for solving for equilibrium. The final case is
when ψ is distributed according to any smooth distribution. I am able to obtain
analytical results for this case, where the results are slightly more restrictive than
that of when ψ is uniformly distributed. Before proceeding to these cases, I will first
outline the monopolist’s problem in all entirety.
Monopolist’s Problem
I assume that the monopolist fully commits to a constant path of prices throughout
time, charging {p∗ = (p∗H , p∗L), f ∗ = (f ∗H , f ∗L)} in each period.
Definition 7 (Monopolist Profit) The firm’s expected profit in steady-state is
Πss ≡ 2 {iHfH + iLfL +
∞∑
t=0
δt+1(pHiH(1− oH)t + pLiL(1− oL)t)}
This function can be thought of as the profit obtained by following the group of
agents of type H and L that entered in the steady-state until the end of their lives.5
By evaluating the summation, I simplify the expression for the steady state profit
to obtain
5As explained in the previous chapter in footnote 6, this is in contrast to another possible (but
incorrect) way of expressing the profit, which would be to take into account all agents on the
platform in steady-state, regardless of the time period in which they joined the platform:
Π = 2
∞∑
t=0
δt
∑
j∈{L,H}
{fj ij,t + µj,t pj}
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Πss = 2{fHiH + fLiL + δiHpH
1− δ(1− oH(pH)) +
δiLpL
1− δ(1− oL(pH , pL))} (2.19)
Given that types are perfectly observable, the monopolist is only concerned about
the individual rationality (participation) constraints. The optimization problem for
the monopolist is defined as follows.
max
pH ,pL,fH ,fL
Πss(α(pH , pL), pH , pL)
s.t. (IRH) CH(α(pH , pL), pH)− fH ≥ 0
(IRL) CL(α(pH , pL), pH , pL)− fL ≥ 0
subject to the steady-state conditions in Definition 6.
The pricing problem is complicated by the fact that changes in prices affect not
only one group of agents, but also the interactions between the group and the other
through the steady-state α. However, since types are observable, the firm will extract
all surplus from the agents, as proven below. This implies that the pricing problem
is equivalent to the planning problem in which the firm maximizes the total surplus
of the agents on the platform, only to charge prices to extract it all from them.
Proposition 16 In any steady state equilibrium with observable types, firm sets fixed
prices f = {fH , fL} and per-interaction prices p = (pH , pL) so that IRH and IRL
bind.
Case I: No to Small Idiosyncratic Matching Shocks
Suppose, to begin, that there are no idiosyncratic shocks in this model. An agent of
type i obtains the following utility when she chooses to match with agent j:
ui(j) =
θj
1− δ
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An agent obtains the type of her match forever, which is discounted by the discount
rate of δ. Agents are risk-neutral and share the same discount rate with the firm. I
can think of there being two steady-state equilibrium: a pooling equilibrium where
H and L types match not only amongst themselves but also with each other, and a
separating equilibrium with H types only match with other H types, and L types
only with other L types.
Since types are perfectly observable, the profit-maximizing monopolist will ex-
tract all surplus from the agents by using a combination of per-interaction prices
p = (pH , pL) and fixed fees f = (fH , fL). All agents have the same outside op-
tion of obtaining zero utility when not on the platform. The individual rationality
constraints for each type will bind, giving
CH − fH = 0
CL − fL = 0
Since types are perfectly observable, I note that solving the monopolist problem is
equivalent to solving the social planner’s problem in which total social surplus is
maximized. An agent’s strategy under this setup is defined as
s∗i =
match with Hmatch with L and H (2.20)
In equilibrium, since H determines whether or not a match forms, L’s only strategy
will be whether or not she will match with another L.
Under this setup, the total social surplus will be a function of all the types of
agents on the platform. For concreteness, suppose that there are only 4 agents in the
market, with types H,H,L, L. There are only two cases—the first in which H −H
match and L− L match, and the other where two H − L matches form. In the first
case, the total amount of surplus that may be extracted is 2( θH
1−δ ) + 2(
θL
1−δ ). In the
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second case, the total amount is surplus that may be extracted is 2( θH
1−δ +
θL
1−δ ). It is
clear then that the total surplus that may be extracted by the monopolist is the same
for both cases; this implies that the monopolist does not care about who matches
with whom, but only about the total surplus that may be extracted. This result
obtains from the fact that the matching utility is additively separable (modular).
Another important fact to note is that an agent’s contribution to the total social
surplus is his or her own type. This is due to the fact that since an agent obtains his
or her partner’s type in a marriage, each agent then contributes his or her own type
to the surplus.
I can now define the total social surplus on the platform. This is given by
Total Social Surplus (TSS) = µH
∞∑
t=0
θH
1− δ δ
t(1− oH)tiH + µL
∞∑
t=0
θL
1− δ δ
t(1− oL)tiL
(2.21)
Note that prices are implicit in the expression of total social surplus. I can ignore
explicit expressions of prices since for any given expected discounted lifetime utility of
being on the platform can be fully extracted by the monopolist given a combination
of prices. The prices only enter in the expression of total social surplus in the outflows
oH and oL, where higher prices would cause agents to be less picky and so, leave the
platform more quickly.
Now, I focus on the simplifying the expression for TSS by looking at optimal
inflows. Since all agents agree on the ranking of the types, H types are considered
desirable by all other agents on the platform. Thus, iH is optimally set to be 1. I
need only characterize what the optimal iL is. In the following proposition, I prove
a strong and interesting result about this model, namely that given the setup and
any range of parameters, the monopolist will price per-interaction prices to extract
all surplus from the agents and make them leave in the first period. Also, given any
range of parameters, the monopolist will choose to let all the L types in, regardless
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of the value of θL.
Proposition 17 Consider the model with no idiosyncratic matching shocks. In the
steady-state equilibrium, the profit-maximizing firm will
1. Set iH = iL = 1.
2. Charge pH , pL sufficiently high to induce all agents to leave in the first period
that they are on the platform.
Proof. Consider the strategy where pH , pL is significantly high to induce all agents
to leave the platform immediately. In this strategy, the corresponding outflow rates
for both types will be exactly 1. Given that oH = oL = 1, I then note that the
only way in which changing iL affects TSS is by affecting how quickly the agents
match, which is expressed through the outflow rates. Given that the outflow rates
are held constant at 1, under this pricing strategy, the TSS becomes an increasing
linear function in iL, implying that the firm optimally sets iL = 1. Now, all that
remains to be shown is the optimality of charging prices that make all agents leave
immediately.
By evaluating the summation in (2.21), I can write the expression as
TSS = µH(
iHθH
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− oH))) + µL(
iLθL
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− oH))) (2.22)
By taking derivatives, I note that
∂TSS
∂oH
,
∂TSS
∂oL
≥ 0
which implies that the optimal pricing strategy is then to set oL = oH = 1. Under
this pricing strategy, I have shown earlier that the corresponding optimal inflows are
iL = iH = 1.
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There is an intuitive interpretation for this result in terms of the discount rate
δ. Consider three cases for the discount rate: δ = 1, δ = 0, and δ ∈ (0, 1). In the
case where δ = 1, any pricing strategy that the firm sets will give the same TSS,
since agents essentially weight each period the same. In the case where δ = 0, the
model reduces to that of a one-period model, where it is obviously optimal for the
profit-maximizing monopolist to extract all surplus by charging the highest possible
per-interaction prices. For any δ ∈ (0, 1), note that TSS is strictly decreasing in
the the number of periods that the agents stay on the platform. This being, the
pricing strategy that forces everyone to leave immediately gives a higher TSS than
any other pricing strategy. Thus, the optimal pricing strategy for the firm is to set
per-interaction prices sufficiently high to induce all agents to leave in the first period.
Now, I would like to make strides towards understanding the model where the
idiosyncratic shock is sufficiently small. I have already shown what the steady-state
equilibrium looks like in the context of no idiosyncratic shocks. What happens when
these shocks are small, i.e. when the support of the distribution of ψ is small? It
turns out that the result for when the shocks are small relative to the size of the types
(θH , θL) is the same as in the case where there are no shocks for a range of parameters
that occurs with positive probability. A sufficient but not necessary condition for
the shock ψ being small is θL
m
≥ δ
1−δ .
Proposition 18 Suppose ψ ∈ [0,m]. Then for parameterizations such that θL
m
≥
δ
1−δ , the profit-maximizing monopolist
1. Sets iH = iL = 1.
2. Charge pH , pL sufficiently high to induce all agents to leave in the first period
that they are on the platform.
Proof. Consider again the expression for total social surplus. Since the matching
utility is additively separable, I may write the total social surplus as
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Total Social Surplus (TSS) =
∑
j∈{L,H}
µj
∞∑
t=0
( θj
1− δ +
E(ψ | j matches)
1− δ
)
δt(1−oj)tij
(2.23)
where µj is the mass of type θj on the platform. By the same reasoning as in the
previous proposition, given the pricing strategy where the firm sets per-interaction
prices sufficiently high to force everyone to match in the first period, it is clear that
iH = iL = 1. Now, consider two pricing scenarios:
1. Per-interaction prices are set sufficiently high to force everyone to match in the
first period and oH = oL = 1.
2. Per-interaction prices are set such that ∃ some measure λH of H agents and
λL of L agents that wait on the platform and do not immediately match.
By assumption of the bounded support of ψ, the worst draw that any agent can
obtain is any period is ψ = 0 and the best is ψ = m. Thus, I can bound the total
social surplus from scenario 1 by the case where agents obtain a shock of ψ = 0 in
each period:
TSS1 ≥ µH( θH
1− δ ) + µL(
θL
1− δ )
Note that the proportion (1 − λH) and (1 − λL) of H and L agents, respectively, I
can write the total social surplus in scenario 2 as:
TSS2 = λHµH TSS2,H + λLµL TSS2,L + (1− λH)µH TSS1,H + (1− λL)µL TSS1,L
where TSSn,j is the total surplus obtained from j ∈ {L,H} in case n ∈ {1, 2}.
I now want to show that TSS1 − TSS2 ≥ 0 for some parameter range. To do
this, I compare the worst case scenario under pricing strategy 1, which is that agents
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obtain ψ = 0 in all subsequent periods, and the best case scenario under pricing
strategy 2, which is that agents wait for a period and obtain ψ = m in the following
period. Under the best case scenario in the second pricing strategy, agents will leave
in the next period since that case is the one where they obtain the most they can
while on the platform and the firm then extracts δ(
θj+m
1−δ ) from each agent of type
j ∈ {L,H}.
Taking the difference between the social surpluses gives
λHµH
(
θH
1−δ − δ( θH+m1−δ )
)
+ λLµL
(
θL
1−δ − δ( θL+m1−δ )
)
≥ 0
⇐⇒ λHµH
(
θH − δm1−δ
)
+ λLµL
(
θL − δm1−δ
)
≥ 0
⇐⇒ θL − δm1−δ ≥ 0
⇐⇒ θL
m
≥ δ
1−δ
I have now shown that for the set of parameters {θL, δ,m} that satisfy θLm ≥ δ1−δ ,
the monopolist firm will set per-interaction prices sufficiently high to force all agents
to match immediately in the first period. In particular, for relatively small values of
δ, the condition on the parameter space is satisfied.
The intuition for these results is as follows. The monopolist only cares about the
total amount of social surplus in the economy. The total social surplus declines as
time goes on and agents are still on the platform by a factor of δ in each period. This
being, the monopolist will want to force agents to match immediately while on the
platform unless there is a non-zero probability of agents obtaining a sufficiently high
draw ψ, which will improve their utility and so increase the amount of surplus that
can be extracted from them. In the case where the idiosyncratic matching shock ψ is
small relative to the size of the types θH and θL, the incentives for the monopolist to
let agents stay on the platform for long are corresponding small. In particular, with
both agents and the monopolist valuing the future very little (implying low values
of δ), there is no incentive for either side to stay longer on the platform when the
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benefit of waiting on the platform for a better ψ is small.
One natural question to ask now is whether the firm charges different per-interaction
and fixed prices to the studs and duds under the parameter range where the pricing
strategy of charging sufficiently high prices to induce agents to match immediately is
implemented. What is observed is that since the monopolist firm lets all agents in to
the platform and outflow rates for both studs and duds are exactly 1, the probability
of meeting a stud or dud is exactly (denoted α) is also exactly 1
2
. Since the chance
of meeting a stud is the same for both types of agents, and per-interaction prices
are set to induce both agents’ acceptance thresholds to be 0 (agents marry their
first match), agents expected lifetime utility of being on the platform is the same
regardless of type. Thus, I obtain the following result that the profit-maximizing
monopolist charges the same fixed prices to both H and L types, despite the fact
that types are observable.
Proposition 19 Suppose θL
m
≥ δ
1−δ and types are perfectly observable. In the steady-
state equilibrium, the profit-maximizing monopolist sets sufficiently high per-interaction
prices p∗H , p
∗
L so that all agents match and exit in the first period and f
∗
H = f
∗
L.
One fact to note is that although the fixed prices are the same for both types of
agents, the optimal per-interaction prices may or may not be the same. In particular,
the only restriction on per-interaction prices is that they have to be sufficiently higher
than a certain threshold. After they reach the threshold, whether or not the per-
interaction prices for studs and duds are the same is inconsequential. However, since
agents do not actually pay the per-interaction prices in the first period that they are
searching on the platform if they marry in the first period, this optimal contract
essentially does not differentiate between types since it only consists of fixed prices.
The per-interaction prices for both types are just set to provide strong incentives
(i.e. force you) to immediately marry the first person you go on a date with.
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Case II: The Idiosyncratic Matching Shock ψ is Uniformly Distributed on
[0,m]
Now, I study the case when the random matching shock ψ is draw from a uniform
distribution on [0,m]. In particular, I would like to elaborate on the assumptions
that the following proposition makes. The facts to note are the following:
1. In studying the case where the shocks are uniformly distributed, I fix the
pricing strategy for the H types. This implies that the analysis done is a
partial equilibrium analysis. Fixing the pricing strategy for the H types is
necessary to keep the H type optimality conditions the same. This is because
by fixing the pricing strategy, I am able simplify the problem greatly due to
the complexities that arise from the fixed point analysis with the proportion of
studs on the platform, α.
2. I assume that iL ∈ (0, 1); that is, that the monopolist is letting in a nonzero
proportion of the L types. In practice, to check whether or not the solution I
obtain is optimal, I may compare the profit obtained from the equilibrium in
the proposition with the one where the firm lets no duds in (i.e. iL = 0).
3. I also assume that for a fixed pL that ψ
∗
L(L) ∈ (0,m). This is to ensure
that prices have a bite; that is, changing prices will actually affect how the L
type optimizes. For example, if the threshold were at 0, L types are already
choosing to always match with other L types and so prices have no effect on
the threshold. The duds would ideally like to lower their threshold with an
increased pL but are unable to do so. In the case where ψ
∗
L(L) = m, L types
never match with other L types anyway, and so prices have no effect on the
thresholds.
Proposition 20 Suppose 0 < iL < 1, fix iH , pH and pL, suppose F is the uniform
distribution with support [0,m], and ψ∗L(L) ∈ (0,m). The firm can strictly increase
profits by increasing both iL and pL by  > 0.
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Corollary 8 Suppose the conditions in the previous proposition hold. In equilibrium,
if the firm chooses to let any L types onto the platform, it will let all of them in (i.e.
set iL = 1).
Note that this corollary does not state whether it is always optimal to let any L
types in (i.e. iL > 0) or whether pL > 0. In particular, it may be that if θH − θL
is very large (or rather if the L type is very ‘weak’), then the optimal choice for iL
may be to set iL = 0 to eliminate the negative externality that L imposes on H.
Despite the small number of primitives in this model, analytical results are diffi-
cult to obtain. This is primarily due to two factors, the first being that the the effects
of perturbations in the model depend on the exact specification of the distribution
function of ψ, F (.). The second reason is because of the fixed point nature of the
equilibrium. In particular, even though agents take the proportion of high types
on the platform, α, as given when optimizing, in equilibrium their thresholds will
determine α. In particular, since prices affect thresholds, prices will then also affect
α through both the thresholds of the agents and the outflow rates for both types. In
assuming a particular form for F , I am able to conduct simulations for a range of
parameters in the model that illustrate the main points of the model without getting
into the complications of striving for analytical results. Next, by fixing the values
for θL, δ, and m, I run simulations that solve for the steady-state equilibrium for
varying values of θH . As we shall see, the results from the simulation agree with the
analytical results that I have presented here.
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Numerical Simulations
In this numerical example, I write a code in Mathematica to simulate the equi-
librium for a given parameter space. For this section, assume that ψ is distributed
uniformly on [0, 4]. Suppose also that δ = 0.9 and θL = 0.5. I will break the parame-
ter space θH−θL into four separate ‘regions’ according to the optimal per-interaction
prices. As we will see later, in each of these regions, I provide the values for the θs,
equilibrium α, all three relevant thresholds (ψ∗H(H), ψ
∗
H(L), and ψ
∗
L(L)), profit when
iL = 1, profit when iL = 0, and optimal per-interaction prices. The reason why I
can restrict myself to values of iL to being only 0 or 1 is by Proposition 20.
The first region for θH − θL is when the difference between the types is small. In
particular,
Region 1: 0 < θH − θL ≤ 2
The results are displayed in Table 2.1. In this region, note that all three thresholds
ψ∗H(H), ψ
∗
H(L), ψ
∗
L(L) are interior and that the optimal per-interaction prices are
strictly positive for both types. Note also that the monopolist profit when no L
types are let in is strictly less than that when the monopolist lets all of the L types
in. This is an intuitive result, especially given that the difference between the types
is not large.
The second region is defined as
Region 2: 3 ≤ θH − θL ≤ 7.5
The results are displayed in Table 2.2. In this region, ψ∗H(H) and ψ
∗
H(L) are still
interior, while ψ∗H(L) is a corner. This means that this is the case where there is
a separating equilibrium with each type only matching with other agents with the
same type, and H types never choosing to match with L types. In this region, per-
interaction prices for L types is always positive, and per-interaction prices for H
types is always negative. Profit is also strictly higher for when the firm lets in all L
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θH θL α ψ
∗
H(H) ψ
∗
H(L) ψ
∗
L(L) Π |iL=1 Π |iL=0 pH pL
0.5 0.499999 0.5 2.3956 2.3956 2.3956 115.826 57.9131 0.0009 0.0009
1 0.5 0.475 1.986 2.486 2.3475 123.321 65.7984 0.595 1.37
1.5 0.5 0.454 1.5445 2.5445 2.3061 130.291 73.7827 1.486 2.089
2 0.5 0.436 1.08771 2.58771 2.27561 136.922 81.8533 2.6 2.89
2.5 0.5 0.420 0.6238 2.6238 2.263 143.362 90 3.89 3.56
Table 2.1: Uniform Distribution Numerical Example (Region 1)
types that not letting any in.
The third region is defined as
Region 3: 8.5 ≤ θH − θL ≤ 15.5
The results are displayed in Table 2.3. In this region, only ψ∗L(L) remains interior.
H types now always match with other H types. Per-interaction prices for H types
are very small and close to 0, while per-interaction prices for L types are always
positive. Profit is strictly higher for the monopolist when it chooses to let all duds
in as compared to if it does not let any in.
The fourth and last region is defined as
Region 4: 24.5 ≤ θH − θL ≤ 44.5
The results are displayed in Table 2.4. This is the region for which the difference
in types, θH − θL, is extremely large. In particular, note that the monopolist profit
when no L types are let onto the platform is strictly higher than the monopolist profit
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θH θL α ψ
∗
H(H) ψ
∗
H(L) ψ
∗
L(L) Π |iL=1 Π |iL=0 pH pL
3.5 0.5 0.476 1.23 4 1.78 140.54 106.49 −0.7 0.66
4 0.5 0.4734 1.12645 4 1.76447 148.049 114.82 −0.8 0.765
5 0.5 0.4688 0.9142 4 1.70562 163.229 131.626 −0.99 1.04
6 0.5 0.4889 1.52261 4 1.76841 176.895 148.602 −4.06 0.66
8 0.5 0.4566 0.36819 4 1.60074 209.859 182.967 −1.76 1.575
Table 2.2: Uniform Distribution Numerical Example (Region 2)
when all L types are let onto the platform. The L type is so bad that the negative
effects of their presence on the platform on the H types greatly outweighs the benefit
that L types get of being on the platform and matching only with each other. In
this region, no L types will be let onto the platform and the monopolist charges 0 to
all H types, which is consistent with the baseline model with no externalities.
Note that since everyone on the platform prefers to match with H types, the
monopolist values the studs and so always lets all H types in; that is, iH = 1. From
these numerical examples using the uniform distribution, I can make the following
observations:
1. As θH − θL → 0, per-interaction prices are optimally set to 0, fixed prices are
set so that the individual rationality constraints bind, and the firm lets both
types into the platform (iH = iL = 1).
2. As θH − θL →∞, the firm will not let any iL in (iL = 0).
3. Optimal per-interaction prices for L types is always strictly positive (pL > 0).
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θH θL α ψ
∗
H(H) ψ
∗
H(L) ψ
∗
L(L) Π |iL=1 Π |iL=0 pH pL
9 0.5 0.444895 0 4 1.52931 225.349 200.323 0.03 1.98
10 0.5 0.447795 0 4 1.46619 241.362 217.778 0.01 2.25
15 0.5 0.46 0 4 1.18132 321.698 306.217 −0.06 3.5
20 0.5 0.47 0 4 0.907 402.426 396 −0.05 4.76
Table 2.3: Uniform Distribution Numerical Example (Region 3)
θH θL α ψ
∗
H(H) ψ
∗
H(L) ψ
∗
L(L) Π |iL=1 Π |iL=0 pH pL
25 0.5 0.48 0 4 0.649 483.482 486 −0.11 6.04
30 0.5 0.488335 0 4 0.390108 564.819 576 0 7.35
45 0.5 0.41874 0 4 2.03219 793.523 846 0 0
Table 2.4: Uniform Distribution Numerical Example (Region 4)
As we have seen through the four different regions, each region has different sign
combinations of optimal per-interaction prices. In the first region, when the difference
θH − θL is very small, the monopolist firm will choose to charge pH , pL > 0. In the
second region, the monopolist charges pH < 0, pL > 0. In the third region, the
monopolist charges pH close to 0 and pL > 0. In the last region where the difference
in types is extremely large, the monopolist chooses to not let in any L types and sets
pH = 0.
The intuition for my results can be obtained by considering the externalities
exerted by both types of the agents onto each other and within their own type.
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First of all, note that studs are valuable to everyone; this includes the monopolist,
duds, and other studs. The H types are very valuable to the monopolist since the
monopolist wants to extract their surplus θH that they bring to any marriage, if it
forms. The H type is valuable to other agents on the platform since the all agents
prefer to match with other H types. Secondly, note that the presence of too many L
types negatively affects the H types, since more duds will lead to a lower α, which
in turns decreases the expected lifetime utility of H types being on the platform.
The firm can observe these externalities and can use per-interaction prices to distort
the optimization problem of the agents by making agents more or less picky. As we
will see, there is a trade off between the gain the monopolist obtains from the L
types by letting them match on the platform and the loss it incurs from the H types
at the same time from having other L types on the platform and facing a lower α.
Consideration is also given to balancing these externalities with those that occur in
between agents of the same type, as in Region 1.
Considering these externalities, I can analyze the effects of type differences and
externalities on per-interaction pricing. Let ∆ ≡ (θH − θL).
1. For any value of ∆, the firm optimally charges the duds a positive per-interaction
price. This is because H types are strictly preferred by the firm and L types can
be seen as ‘clogging up the system’, even when their type is not too different
from that of studs. The monopolist can push the L quicker through the system
by charging a positive per-interaction price, which increases as the difference
in types increases. In particular, having even a small positive per-interaction
price for the duds, pL, decreases the time that duds spend on the platform,
which in turn will increase α, the proportion of studs on the platform. By
Proposition 13, an increase in α increases the happiness of the studs, which
allows the firm to extract more in surplus. In any case, the fact that pL > 0 is
unsurprising, since I have already proven that this is the case in Corollary 9 in
Case III where F , the distribution of ψ, is any smooth distribution.
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2. When ∆ is small (Region 1), a positive price pH would increase the chance that
L will match with H types since it lowers H’s matching thresholds and makes
them less picky. This benefits the L types.
3. When ∆ is small (Region 1), a positive price pH would also increase the chance
that H types match with other H types. An increased per-interaction price
lowers H’s matching threshold of dating other H types. This benefits the
monopolist, who cares about extracting all the surplus it can, and would very
much like to extract as many θH terms as possible.
4. When ∆ is not too large (Region 2), note that ψ∗H(L) = 4, which is a corner
solution. The other two thresholds, ψ∗L(L) and ψ
∗
H(H), are interior. The fact
that ψ∗H(L) = 4 implies that studs never marry duds. In this case, the monop-
olist loses out on all surplus that could have resulted from all of the stud-dud
marriages that could have occurred. The firm makes up for by charging nega-
tive per-interaction prices to studs and increasing their pickiness. This causes
them to stay on the platform longer to search and in turn, increases the pro-
portion of studs on the platform, α. By Proposition 13, this makes the studs
happier, which allows the firm to extract more in surplus from them. I can
also relate the results from Region 2 to the externalities found in Shimer and
Smith (2001). There are two externalities in play, the thick-market externality
and the congestion externality. First of all, the thick-market externality im-
plies that studs do not internalize the fact that by leaving the platform, they
decrease α, which negatively affects other studs. Secondly, since studs never
marry duds, an increase in α negatively affects the duds, since the duds will
have to waste time and money by going on many dates with agents who will
never marry them. The monopolist then weighs the benefit to the studs of
having a higher α to the loss incurred by the duds with having more studs on
the platform and finds that the thick-market externality is stronger than the
congestion externality. This being, the monopolist will set pH to be negative
76
to increase α.
5. When ∆ is large (Region 3), note that ψ∗L(L) is interior but ψ
∗
H(H) and ψ
∗
H(L)
are both corner solutions. This means that studs always marry other studs
and never marry duds. In this region, the firm’s instrument of per-interaction
prices have no bite with the studs, since their thresholds are both already at
the corner. In particular, since ∆ is large, the firm is not able to charge a very
high positive pH to lower the threshold ψ
∗
H(L), and is not able to charge a very
low negative price pH to increase ψ
∗
H(H). This implies that the equilibrium
pricing strategy for the studs consists of a range of per-interaction prices pH ,
where this range also includes the non-distortionary zero. The condition that
this equilibrium range must satisfy is that the price pH is not too extreme—if
pH is either too low or too high, the thresholds for the studs will change.
6. When ∆ is extremely large (Region 4), L types are not let onto the platform.
This reduces to the baseline model with no externalities studied in Section 4.
Case III: The Idiosyncratic Matching Shock ψ is Distributed According
to Any Smooth Distribution
The next proposition assumes that the random draw ψ is drawn from a smooth
distribution F . Again, I fix the pricing strategy for the H types to simplify the fixed
point analysis with α. The result that I obtain for an arbitrary smooth distribution
is weaker than that for the uniform distribution. This can be seen through the
conditions that need to hold for the result to be true. In particular, I am requiring
the rather strict condition that ψ∗L(L) |pL=0 ∈ (0,m). This is because I am interested
in studying the perturbation of pL around the efficient level of 0.
Proposition 21 Suppose that F is continuously differentiable, f(x) > c > 0 where
c is a constant ∀x ∈ [0,m], and ψ∗L(L) |pL=0 ∈ (0,m). For any initial value of
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0 < iL < 1 and fixed pricing strategy for the H types, the monopolist can strictly
increase profit by increasing iL and pL by a small amount.
Corollary 9 Suppose the conditions from the previous proposition hold. If the mo-
nopolist serves any of the L types, it optimally sets pL > 0.
In this case, we see that the monopolist optimally charges positive per-interaction
prices to L types. This is also consistent with numerical simulations from Case II,
where we saw that pL was always positive, even when the difference in types (θH−θL)
is very small. This is mainly due to the vertical type setup in the model, where
the monopolist must balance the benefits from having some duds on the platform
marrying and contributing θL to the total surplus, and the fact that studs are made
worse off in the presence of duds.
Case IV: The Idiosyncratic Matching Shock ψ is Distributed According
to a Two-Point Distribution Examples
Up till now, I have considered distributions that have continuous support. Another
distribution of interest is the two-point mass distribution, where the idiosyncratic
shock ψ can either be a ‘good’ value of γ > 0 with probability q, or a ‘bad’ value of 0
with probability 1−q. Optimal matching behavior of the agents will take on discrete
jumps, depending on what the draw ψ is. In particular, the cumulative distribution
function F (.) of such a distribution will take the form of
F (ψ) =

0 if ψ < 0
1− q if ψ ∈ [0, γ)
1 if ψ ≥ γ
Fixing the pricing and inflow strategies of the firm, I can then consider a finite (and
small) number of cases for the matching behaviors of the H and L types.
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of F (ψ) when q = 0.5 and γ = 2
There are a couple of restrictions that will greatly reduce the number of cases
that must be considered when doing these examples. Recall that since the studs
are pickier than the duds, it is always true that ψ∗H(L) > ψ
∗
L(L). Secondly, I can
ignore the cases when either H or L do not match with any other types, regardless
of what the idiosyncratic shock is. This is because these cases are fundamentally
uninteresting, and essentially boil down to the model with no externalities since only
one (or no) types will be on the platform. Thirdly, I can ignore the cases when a
type matches with another type with a bad draw but refuses to match with the same
type with a good draw. This is because the utility obtained from matching with any
type with a good draw is always strictly higher than that of a type with a bad signal.
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 then summarize the number of cases that I consider for the
types H and L. From the point of view of the H types, there will be 5 cases. The
terms HG refers to ‘H types with G(ood) draws’, HB to ‘H types with B(ad) draws’,
LG to ‘L types with G(ood) draws’, and LB to ‘L types with B(ad) draws’. Within
each case, a Xdenotes the willingness of the type to match with the other type, and
a × denotes the unwillingness to match. The first case for a type H will be the case
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when he always marries whoever he meets while on the platform. The second case
is when H marries all other types but L types with a bad draw. The third case is
when H only matches with other H types, the fourth case is when H only matches
to other types with good signals, and the last case is the case when H is pickiest and
only matches to other H types with good signals. It is important to note that the
set of cases that are actually considered when the matching behavior is fixed may
be fewer than the full set of possible cases. This is because the parameters of the
model determine the flow utility of the agents, which then determines the matching
behavior. This will be illustrated in greater detail in the later examples.
Cases → 1 2 3 4 5
HG X X X X X
HB X X X × ×
LG X X × X ×
LB X × × × ×
Table 2.5: Cases From the Point of View of the H Type
Cases → 1 2
HG - -
HB - -
LG X X
LB X ×
Table 2.6: Cases From the Point of View of the L Type
From the point of view of the L type, whether or not they match to another H
depends on the H type. Thus, for each possible matching strategy for the H type,
L has only two strategies: to only match with another L with a good signal, or to
match with all other L types regardless of the signal. This simplifies the calculations
for this example greatly, since I need only consider two possibilities for the L type.
I compute the numerical examples in this subsection by employing partial Nash
equilibrium analysis. First of all, I will assume a set of parameters for the model;
that is, I will fix values for the variables θH , θL, q, δ, and γ. Then, I proceed by doing
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the following:
1. Fix the matching behavior of all agents; that is, fix the cases for both types L
and H. From Table 1, I have 5 possible cases for type H, and for each of these
H cases, there are 2 cases for the L type.
2. Assuming that firm’s strategy is fixed, compute the range of prices that would
support the underlying assumed matching behavior. That is, if I assume that
H types will operate under the matching behavior in case 1 and L agents will
also match according to case 1 (from here onwards known as case H1L1), then
I can compute the differences in the expected discounted lifetime continuation
utilities for H and L under H1L1 and compare it to all other utilities from other
strategies like H1L2, H2L1, H2L2, H3L1, etc. Taking the difference between
the utilities of H1L1 and all the other cases gives me 4 inequalities which
will depend on price ranges. In short, I can list the following inequalities for
each case k to find the corresponding price ranges that support the assumed
matching behavior:
Cθ,k ≥ Cθ,¬k ∀θ ∈ {θH , θL}
These pairwise no-deviation conditions allow me to characterize a price region
for each case.
3. Since it is never optimal for the firm to set per-interaction prices that are very
low (i.e. approaching −∞), I also impose the condition that
Cθi ≤ min{
θj
1− δ ,
θj + γ
1− δ }
for all θi ∈ {θH , θL} and for θj for which θi chooses to match to. Note that the
pricing region may, however, become arbitrarily large (approaches ∞) if the
firm intends to make it extremely costly for the agent to stay on the platform.
4. Using the assumed matching behavior and the assumed values for inflows, I
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can solve for α and the outflows, oH and oL.
5. Proceeding to now holding agent behavior fixed, I can calculate the profit the
firm obtains for each case for matching behaviors. The firm can solves the
following problem:
max
k
Πk
This procedure allows me to find an equilibrium in the model. One important fact
to note is that since I am assuming a matching behavior at the start, within the
range of prices that rationalizes that particular matching behavior, profit remains
constant. This is because an agent’s behavior does not change for the range of prices
that rationalizes the behavior. Also, since the firm and agents both discount at the
same rate, as the firm extracts full surplus from the agents in a combination of per-
interaction and fixed prices, the agent does not care whether the surplus is taken
away earlier in fixed fees or sequentially later on in per-interaction prices. The firm
is able to maximize its profits by essentially choosing the matching behavior it wants
to induce that gives it the highest profit. It is also crucial to note that the range of
prices (pH , pL) that I obtain from these cases will partition R2. In particular, fixing
the parameters of the model, as prices vary, I expect matching behavior to also vary.
I would also like to highlight the inflow values iH and iL that the firm chooses. In
my analysis, the matching behavior is assumed to be given by fixing both the pricing
strategy pH , pL and the inflow rates iH , iL. In equilibrium, the firm will optimally
set iH = 1 and let all types in, since the H types are desired by everyone. I first
assume, in the following examples, that fixing the matching behavior, the firm will
also let all L types in. At the end of my analysis, I verify whether it is true that iL is
actually set to 1 in equilibrium. Intuitively, one may think that iL may not be 1 for
all parameter ranges, especially those in which the difference θH − θL is very large
(in which case it is probable that the firm will want to fully exclude the L types).
Assuming that iL = 1, I can check whether or not all of the matching behaviors can
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be implemented with a set of prices. If it is true that all cases can be implemented
by a price schedule, then it is then verified that iL must be 1. This is because a lower
iL corresponds to a lower profit for the firm, since the matching behavior for each
case is already fixed and iL only matters to the point where it affects α, which would
in turn affect the optimality conditions for the agent. Since the matching behavior
is fixed, iL would have no impact on the agent’s problem but would have a linearly
increasing effect on firm profits.6 I proceed by computing four examples, where the
parameters of interest that will be varied are the types θH , θL, while keeping the sum
of the types, θH + θL, constant.
Example 10 Suppose θH = 4, θL = 1, δ = 0.9, γ = 2, q =
1
2
. The possible flow
utilities are given by Table 2.7.
Cases Flow Utility
HG 6
HB 4
LG 3
LB 1
Table 2.7: Flow Utilities for Example 10
The seven possible matching outcomes are then H1L1, H2L1, H2L2, H3L1, H3L2,
H5L1, and H5L2. The results for this example are displayed in Table 2.8. Equilib-
rium profit is $141.53, with the matching behavior induced being that H types always
match to other H types, and both types H and L only match to L types if the draw
is good. In this example, note that the per-interaction price for L types is a unique
number, $13.59, which is positive. The optimal per-interaction prices for H types is
a set of strictly positive numbers. As stated before, the reason why there is a range
of number that rationalizes this behavior is because the discreteness of the draw ψ;
in particular, for a range of prices, there will be a range of thresholds for which the
6In any case, I prove that the monopolist profit is strictly increasing in iL under the parameters
in each of the following examples in the appendix.
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Matching Behavior α oH oL ΠH ΠL pH pL Π
ψ∗H(H), ψ
∗
H(L) < 0, ψ
∗
L(L) ∈ [0, γ) 12 1 1 63 63 [21.5,∞) [21.5,∞) 126
ψ∗H(H) < 0, ψ
∗
H(L) ∈ [0, γ), ψ∗L(L) < 0 12 34 34 75.4839 58.0645 [6, 21.5] [14.75,∞) 133.548
ψ∗H(H) < 0, ψ
∗
H(L) ∈ [0, γ), ψ∗L(L) ∈ [0, γ)
√
2− 1 1√
2
1
2
72.1018 69.425 [4.46, 19.18] 13.59 141.527
ψ∗H(H) < 0, ψ
∗
H(L) > γ, ψ
∗
L(L) < 0
1
2
1
2
1
2
81.8182 32.7273 [0.5, 6] [3.5,∞) 114.545
ψ∗H(H) < 0, ψ
∗
H(L) > γ, ψ
∗
L(L) ∈ [0, γ)
√
2− 1 √2− 1 1− 1√
2
78.8491 43.4983 [−0.27, 4.46] (−3, 4.27] 122.348
ψ∗H(H) ∈ [0, γ), ψ∗H(L) > γ, ψ∗L(L) < 0 2−
√
2 1− 1√
2
√
2− 1 86.9971 31.5396 (−6, 1.27] [2.73,∞) 118.537
ψ∗H(H) ∈ [0, γ), ψ∗H(L) > γ, ψ∗L(L) ∈ [0, γ) 12 14 14 83.0769 41.5385 (−6, 0.5] 3.5 124.615
Table 2.8: Two Point Example: θH = 4, θL = 1, γ = 2, δ = 0.9, and q =
1
2
optimal matching behavior is the same.
Example 11 Suppose that θH = 3.5, θL = 1.5, δ = 0.9, γ = 2, q =
1
2
. The possible
flow utilities are given by Table 11. The five possible matching outcomes that can
be induced are then H1L1, H2L1, H2L2, H5L1 and H5L2. Note that this is an
interesting case in that the flow utility obtained by matching with an H type with a
bad draw is the same as matching with an L type with a good draw. The various profits
for each matching behavior are displayed in Table 2.10. The equilibrium matching
behavior that is induced is the same as in Example 10, with studs always matching
to other studs and any other type only matching to L types when the random draw
ψ is good. The equilibrium profit is $141.45. In this equilibrium, note that both per-
interaction prices are positive. The exact price, however, cannot be pinned down due
to the optimal price range for both types being a set instead of a singleton.
Example 12 Suppose now that θH = 3, θL = 2, δ = 0.9, γ = 2, q =
1
2
. The possible
flow utilities are given by Table 12. The seven possible matching behaviors that are
possible with these parameters ranges are then H1L1, H2L1, H2L2, H4L1, H4L2,
H5L1, and H5L2. In this case, note that matching with a low type with a good type
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Cases Flow Utility
HG 5.5
HB or LG 3.5
LB 1.5
Table 2.9: Flow Utilities for Example 11
Matching Behavior α oH oL ΠH ΠL pH pL Π
ψ∗H(H), ψ
∗
H(L), ψ
∗
L(L) < 0
1
2
1 1 63 63 [16.5,∞) [16.5,∞) 126
ψ∗H(H) < 0, ψ
∗
H(L) ∈ [0, γ), ψ∗L(L) < 0 12 34 34 72.58 60.968 [1, 16.5] [12,∞) 133.548
ψ∗H(H) < 0, ψ
∗
H(L), ψ
∗
L(L) ∈ [0, γ)
√
2− 1 1√
2
1
2
70.619 70.8288 [0.23, 14.96] [0.23, 11.23] 141.448
ψ∗H(H) ∈ [0, γ), ψ∗H(L) > γ, ψ∗L(L) < 0 2−
√
2 1− 1√
2
√
2− 1 79.75 39.4245 (−5.5, 1.77] [2.23,∞) 119.172
ψ∗H(H) ∈ [0, γ), ψ∗H(L) > γ, ψ∗L(L) ∈ [0, γ) 12 14 14 76.1538 48.4615 [−5.5, 1] [−3.5, 3] 124.615
Table 2.10: Two Point Example: θH = 3.5, θL = 1.5, γ = 2, δ = 0.9, and q =
1
2
gives strictly higher flow utility than matching with a high type with a bad draw. The
results are displayed in Table 2.12. The equilibrium matching behavior that is induced
is such that all types only match with other types with good ψ draws, with equilibrium
profit being $147.28. An interesting point to note is that the per-interaction prices
that can be supported as an equilibrium in this example include setting pH = pL = 0,
where, recalling from earlier work in the paper, setting per-interaction prices equal to
0 is the efficient, no externality outcome.
Cases Flow Utility
HG 5
LG 4
HB 3
LB 2
Table 2.11: Flow Utilities for Example 12
Example 13 Suppose that θH = 4.5, θL = 0.5, γ = 2, δ = 0.9, q =
1
2
. The flow
utilities are given in Table 13. This example is similar to Example 10, in which the
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Matching Behavior α oH oL ΠH ΠL pH pL Π
ψ∗H(H), ψ
∗
H(L), ψ
∗
L(L) < 0
1
2
1 1 63 63 [11.5,∞) [11.5,∞) 126
ψ∗H(H) < 0, ψ
∗
H(L) ∈ [0, γ), ψ∗L(L) < 0 12 34 34 69.68 63.871 [3.75, 11.5] [9.25,∞) 133.548
ψ∗H(H) < 0, ψ
∗
H(L) ∈ [0, γ), ψ∗L(L) ∈ [0, γ)
√
2− 1 1√
2
1
2
69.1363 72.23 [3.36, 10.73] 8.86 141.369
ψ∗H(H) ∈ [0, γ), ψ∗H(L) ∈ [0, γ), ψ∗L(L) < 0 2−
√
2 1
2
1√
2
75.04 66.17 [−1.36, 4.14] [9.64,∞) 141.211
ψ∗H(H), ψ
∗
H(L), ψ
∗
L(L) ∈ [0, γ) 12 12 12 73.64 73.64 [−1.75, 3.75] [−1.75, 9.25] 147.28
ψ∗H(H) ∈ [0, γ), ψ∗H(L) > γ, ψ∗L(L) < 0 2−
√
2 1− 1√
2
√
2− 1 72.4974 47.309 [−5,−1.36] [1.73,∞) 119.807
ψ∗H(H) ∈ [0, γ), ψ∗H(L) > γ, ψ∗L(L) ∈ [0, γ) 12 14 14 69.2308 55.38 [−5,−1.75] [−4, 2.5] 124.615
Table 2.12: Two Point Example: θH = 3, θL = 2, γ = 2, δ = 0.9, and q =
1
2
flow utility that the agent gets obeys the following order:
uHG > uHB > uLG > uLB
However, the difference between the two examples is that in Example 10, θH−θL = 3,
which is smaller than the difference between the θs in this example, which is 4.
There are seven possible matching outcomes in this example. These are H1L1,
H2L1, H2L2, H3L1, H3L2, H5L1, and H5L2. The results are provided in Table
2.14. The matching equilibrium that is induced is that H types always choose to
match with other H types, and both types only choose to match with L types when
their ψ draw is good. In equilibrium, firm earns a profit of $141.61 and charges
positive per-interaction prices to both H and L types.
The explanations for the equilibrium prices for these four examples follow a similar
intuition to the case when ψ is uniformly distributed. First of all, note that in in
Examples 10, 11, and 13, we have that the difference between the types, θH − θL,
is ‘large’ with values ranging from 2 to 4. In these three examples, equilibrium
matching behavior is such that studs always marry other studs regardless of the
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Cases Flow Utility
HG 6.5
LG 4.5
HB 2.5
LB 0.5
Table 2.13: Flow Utilities for Example 13
Matching Behavior α oH oL ΠH ΠL pH pL Π
ψ∗H(H), ψ
∗
H(L), ψ
∗
L(L) < 0
1
2
1 1 63 63 [26.5,∞) [26.5,∞) 126
ψ∗H(H) < 0, ψ
∗
H(L) ∈ [0, γ), ψ∗L(L) < 0 12 34 34 78.3871 55.1613 [11, 26.5] [17.5,∞) 133.548
ψ∗H(H) < 0, ψ
∗
H(L) ∈ [0, γ), ψ∗L(L) ∈ [0, γ)
√
2− 1 1√
2
1
2
73.5845 68.0213 [8.68, 23.41] [4.96, 15.96] 141.606
ψ∗H(H) < 0, ψ
∗
H(L) > γ, ψ
∗
L(L) < 0
1
2
1
2
1
2
90 24.55 [−1.12× 10−14, 11] [2.39,∞) 114.55
ψ∗H(H) < 0, ψ
∗
H(L) > γ, ψ
∗
L(L) ∈ [0, γ)
√
2− 1 √2− 1 1− 1√
2
86.734 36.35 [−0.772, 8.684] [−2.5, 4.772] 122.983
ψ∗H(H) ∈ [0, γ), ψ∗H(L) > γ, ψ∗L(L) < 0 2−
√
2 1− 1√
2
√
2− 1 91.248 23.6547 [−6.5, 0.772] [3.228,∞) 117.902
ψ∗H(H) ∈ [0, γ), ψ∗H(L) > γ, ψ∗L(L) ∈ [0, γ) 12 14 14 90 34 [−6.5,−1.12× 10−14] [−2.5, 4] 124
Table 2.14: Two Point Example: θH = 4.5, θL = 0.5, γ = 2, δ = 0.9, and q =
1
2
ψ draw, and studs marry duds and duds marry each other only when the draw is
good. In these examples, even though equilibrium pricing is a set, all numbers in
the intervals for the optimal pH and pL are strictly positive, implying that optimal
prices are strictly positive. The reasoning for why pL is positive is the same as in
Case II with the uniformly distributed idiosyncratic matching shocks ψ. Duds are
always seen as inferior and potentially as also clogging up the platform and so they
are charged positive per-interaction prices to induce them to leave more frequently.
This in turn increases the proportion of studs on the platform, α, which makes the
studs happier and enables the firm to extract more in surplus from them. In these
three examples, pH is also positive to encourage H to be less picky when deciding
who to marry. In particular, a positive per-interaction price pH encourages studs to
match with L types with good draws, despite the fact that the difference between
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the vertical types, θH − θL, is large.
In Example 12, we see that the difference between types is smallest, i.e. θH−θL =
1. In this example, since types are similar, the effect of externalities on the platform
is also less. In particular, the monopolist may not need to charge high per-interaction
prices to studs in order to make them less picky and force them to marry duds. The
studs are also not made much worse off in the presence of duds through a lower α.
This can also be seen through the fact that the matching behavior that is induced
involves all types only marrying their date if their shock is good. Thus, even though
the equilibrium optimal prices are intervals, these intervals also include the possible
per-interaction price of 0 for both types of agents. This implies that the monopolist
may charge the efficient, no externalities level of per-interaction prices, aligning with
the reality that externalities (as seen through differences in types) are not strong.
2.5.3 Firm Operates Only One Platform - Unobservable Types
Suppose now that types are unobservable to the monopolist. A note to make, and
one that will be expanded on later in Section 6, is the fact that even though there
are many interesting questions to be asked when we consider a world where agents
can lie about their type, this particular model setup is not the best one to study such
issues. This is primarily due to the fact that a lie about one’s type does not affect the
person’s ability to obtain a date since in my model, every agent receives a random
draw of a date in each period that they are on the platform. In the unobservable
types setting as studied here, agents can also lie to the monopolist but not to other
agents on the platform, who will be able to see their type once they are on a date.
This is hard to rationalize, since one would imagine that an agent should not be
able to lie to the monopolist but not to other agents, particularly in an online dating
platform world where characteristics are partially observable through dating profiles.
I assert that a better setup to studying lying on dating platforms would expand on
the Burdett and Coles (1997) model, as outlined in the conclusion to this essay.
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In any case, some of the results from observable types carry on to the case where
types are unobservable. This is due to the fact that the set of pricing strategies that
the monopolist can choose from decreases with the addition of constraints in the
unobservable type optimization problem; thus, the pricing strategy that is optimal
in the larger set of mechanisms is surely optimal in the constrained set.
Conducting examples and simulations in the case where types are unobservable is
significantly more complicated than when types were observable. This is due to the
fact that the addition of the incentive compatibility constraints add another layer
of complexity to solving for a steady-state equilibrium. For example, I could easily
solve for equilibrium in the case where the distribution function for ψ was a two-point
mass distribution when types were observable because of the fact that there was full
surplus extraction from the point of view of the monopolist. However, this may no
longer be true in the case where types are unobservable. In particular, full surplus
is extracted from L types but this may not be true for H types. In the following
subsections, I first highlight the monopolist’s problem and then study some of the
results that carry over from the case when types are observable.
Monopolist’s Problem
Let Πθ be the profit that the monopolist obtains from agents of type θ. In equilibrium,
the monopolist’s beliefs about the proportion of studs on the platform is correct, and
is exactly equal to α. Thus, when types are unobservable, the monopolist solves the
following optimization problem:
max
fH ,fL,pH ,pL
Π ≡ 2{αΠH + (1− α)ΠL}
s. t.
IRL : CL(pL)− fL ≥ 0
IRH : CH(pH)− fH ≥ 0
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ICL : CL(pL)− fL ≥ CL(pH)− fH
ICH : CH(pH)− fH ≥ CH(pL)− fL
Note now that since the monopolist does not observe types, it does not have the
ability to choose the proportion of any type that joins in the platform in each plat-
form, iH and iL. Consistent with standard mechanism design results, I obtain the
following proposition.
Proposition 22 The monopolist optimally sets p∗ = (p∗H , p
∗
L) and f
∗ = (f ∗H , f
∗
L) so
that IRL and ICH binds:
CL(p
∗
L) = f
∗
L (2.24)
CH(p
∗
H)− CH(p∗L) = f ∗H − f ∗L (2.25)
That is, there is full surplus extraction from L types and the incentive compatibility
constraint is set so that H types have no incentive to lie and misreport their type.
Optimal Pricing
There are two main results that carry over from the observable type case. These two
have to do with when the shocks ψ are ‘small’, where a sufficient but not necessary
condition for this is when θL
m
≥ δ
1−δ . The first result characterizes equilibrium per-
interaction prices.
Proposition 23 Suppose ψ ∈ [0,m] and types are unobservable by the monopolist.
For the parameterizations such that θL
m
≥ δ
1−δ , the profit-maximizing monopolist op-
timally charges p∗H , p
∗
L sufficiently high to induce all agents to leave in the first period
that they are on the platform.
Given that all agents leave in the first period, as I did for the case when types are
observable, I can also fully characterize the optimal price schedule for both studs and
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duds. The next result informs us that the monopolist will set two price schedules for
the types, where the fixed prices are the same and the per-interaction prices induce
agents to marry and exit the platform in the first period. Note that even though the
per-interaction prices for both of the types may be the same, they do not necessarily
have to be. The only restriction is that they are sufficiently high. However, as
pointed out for the case when types are observable, since agents do not actually pay
the per-interaction prices if they marry in the first period, the contract only specifies
a fixed fee that does not discriminate between types. The per-interaction prices are
only set to induce agents to marry the first agent they go out on a date with.
Proposition 24 Suppose θL
m
≥ δ
1−δ and types are unobservable. In the steady-state
equilibrium, the profit-maximizing monopolist sets sufficiently high per-interaction
prices p∗H , p
∗
L so that all agents marry and exit in the first period and f
∗
H = f
∗
L.
In the last section of this essay, I outline a better model for studying the case
when types are not observable by the monopolist and agents have the ability to lie
about their types.
2.6 Conclusion
In this essay, I have presented a pricing model on a two-sided matching platform with
agents who are differentiated according to both a vertical and horizontal component.
Agents can either be a high type or low type and receive an idiosyncratic matching
shock before they decide whether or not to marry. I analyzed the baseline case where
there are no externalities (only one type on the platform) with observable types and
found that the efficient per-interaction price is set to be at the ‘non-distortionary’
level of 0. I then studied two other cases with externalities—one where the firm is
able to operate two platforms, and the other where it may not do so. If the firm is
able to operate two separate platforms, it will fully separate the two types and the
pricing equilibrium will be the same as the case with no externalities. For the case
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when the firm is operates only one platform with observable types, I studied four
different scenarios for the idiosyncratic matching shock ψ. I studied the case when
there are no to small idiosyncratic matching shocks, uniformly distributed shocks,
the case when ψ is distributed according to any smooth distribution, and when ψ
is distributed according to a two-point distribution. From my results and numerical
simulations, I found ‘separating’ equilibrium where studs only marry other studs
and duds only marry other duds and ‘pooling’ equilibrium where studs and duds
intermarry. I have also found pricing equilibrium where the monopolist firm charges
both studs and duds a distortionary per-interaction fee (negative and positive for
the studs; positive for the duds) in order to correct for externalities on the platform.
As pointed out in the paper, despite the small number of primitives in this model,
solving for steady-state equilibrium is very mathematically involved. This being, I
used numerical simulations to guide my intuition for the model.
The second case with externalities that I studied was the case when types are
not observable by the monopolist. In the current setup of my model, agents have
the ability to lie about their types to the monopolist but are not able to do to other
agents on the platform. An agent’s ability to obtain a draw of a date is also not
effected by their type report since all agents receive a random draw of a date every
period that they keep searching on the platform. The results that I obtain for the
case of unobservable types are carry from the observable type case for when the
idiosyncratic matching shock is sufficiently small. I find that the firm will charge
high per-interaction prices to induce all agents on the platform to marry and leave
in the first period, and charge the same fixed fees to studs and duds to extract all
remaining surplus.
There are two possible extensions to this essay. Firstly, the issue of studying
lying while on a two-sided matching platform is one that the literature has yet to
address. As I noted in Section 5, my current model setup with unobservable is not
able to address this issue adequately; in addition, due to complications from the
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fixed point problem in solving for α, I am not able to analytically solve for much.
The next project on my research agenda involves extending this essay to incorporate
lying when types are unobservable by the firm. In particular, I would like to study
a matching model a` la Burdett and Coles (1997), where timing in a period proceeds
as follows:
1. Agents report their type to the monopolist. Given their report, they face a
pricing schedule.
2. Agents receive a random draw of another agent on the platform. Given the
opposing agent’s report, the agent decides whether or not to go on a date. If
they do decide to go on a date, both agents incur an effort cost. If they do not
decide to go on a date, agents keep searching in the next period and receive a
new random draw.
3. Once on the date, all uncertainty is resolved–agents learn each others’ types,
and decide whether or not to marry.
Under this model setup, agent types are uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Agents
receive each other’s type when they marry. In equilibrium, I expect to see the same
partitioning of the interval into classes, just as in Burdett and Coles (1997). I also
expect to see agents at the bottom of each class lying and misreporting their type.
In particular, I expect to see them misreport their type as being higher and pool
with agents above them in the same class. This is consistent with what we observe
in real-life, where agents tend to misreport their type by a small amount while on
matching platforms. This can be also be seen through Figure 2.6, where real-life
data was collected from users on the online dating website OKCupid. Agents have
an incentive to lie about their types by a small amount to get dates with other agents,
but not too much to the point where the lie is outrageous and cause their date to
never want to see (or marry) them again.
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Figure 2.2: Lying on Online Dating Platforms
The second extension of this essay relates to the tradeoff between matching on
a vertical and horizontal component. In the situation where types are perfectly
observable, the monopolist firm acts a social planner who maximizes total consumer
surplus, only to extract it all using a combination of fixed and per-interaction prices.
The firm has an incentive to let agents stay on the platform if it means that there
is a good chance that they will obtain a good horizontal shock ψ, in which case
their matching utility (and so, surplus) increases. A model that explicitly models
and studies this tradeoff would be interesting to study, particularly since it has the
potential to explain real-life matching behavior, where many people stay on online
dating platforms for a long time in hopes of meeting the ‘right person’.
In general, this essay provides a way to embed a pricing model into a two-sided
matching framework with search. Being the first model to study pricing in a world
where agents both care about a vertical and horizontal component, it opens doors
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to many other related research questions. In particular, even though the model in
this essay is mathematically difficult to analyze, it provides a foundation to future
work in building more tractable models that study pricing problems and matching
behavior on two-sided platforms.
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2.7 Appendix
Proposition (10)
Proof.
Recall the Bellman Equation
Vi(ψ | j) = max{θj + ψ
1− δ , δ(αVi(ψ | H) + (1− α)Vi(ψ | L))− pi} (2.26)
When deciding whether to match with agent j, agent i takes prices and also the
function Vi(ψ | ¬j) as given. Thus, we may rewrite the above equation as
Vi(ψ | j) = max{θj + ψ
1− δ , α¯Vi(ψ | j) + c} (2.27)
where, assuming with no loss of generality that j = H,
α¯ = δα
and
c = δ(1− α)Vi(ψ | L)− pi
where both c and α¯ are constants. To prove the fixed point is unique, I first show
that the two conditions of the Blackwell Sufficient Conditions Theorem is proven.
This will show that T is a contraction. The contraction mapping theorem will then
show that T has a unique fixed point.
The first is monotonicity. Let Vi(ψ | j) ≤ Wi(ψ | j). Then
T (Vi(ψ | j)) = max{ θj+ψ1−δ , α¯Vi(ψ | j) + c}
≤ max{ θj+ψ
1−δ , α¯Wi(ψ | j) + c}
≤ T (Wi(ψ | j))
The second sufficient condition is discounting. Let a ≥ 0 and f ∈ B(X). Then
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T ((Vi(ψ | j) + a)(x)) = max{ θj+ψ1−δ , α¯((Vi + a)(ψ | j) + c}
= max{ θj+ψ
1−δ , α¯Vi(ψ | j) + α¯a+ c}
≤ max{ θj+ψ
1−δ , α¯Vi(ψ | j) + c}+ α¯a
= T (Vi(ψ | j)) + α¯a
Proposition (11)
Proof.
Recall that
Ci =
θH + ψ
∗
i (H)
1− δ =
θL + ψ
∗
i (L)
1− δ
at the interior thresholds. Since θH − θL > 0, we get that
ψ∗i (L)− ψ∗i (H) = θH − θL > 0
Proposition (12)
Proof. Note that since
Ci =
θH + 
∗
i (H)
1− δ =
θL + 
∗
i (L)
1− δ (2.28)
proving that CH > CL is the same as showing that
ψ∗H(j) > ψ
∗
H(j) ∀j ∈ {L,H}
Thus, proving (4) proves (3). From a previous proposition, we know that ∀i ∈
{L,H}, ψ∗i (L) ≥ ψ∗i (H), which implies that, for a fixed i,
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P (i matches with H) = 1− F (ψ∗i (H)) > P (i matches with L) = 1− F (ψ∗i (L))
Since θH > θL, H can always pretend to be L, mimic the strategy of L(ψ
∗
L) and
obtain CL. By the optimality of ψ
∗, it must be that
CH(ψ
∗
H) > CH(ψH)
That is, H must obtain strictly more more he uses the optimal ψ∗ strategy compared
to any other possible strategy. This gives that
CH(ψ
∗
H) > CH(ψH) ≥ CL(ψ∗L) for any other strategy ψH
I have demonstrated that CH(ψ
∗
H) ≥ CL(ψ∗L), which implies that ψ∗H(H) ≥ ψ∗L(H).
Now I must show that CH(ψ
∗
H) 6= CL(ψ∗L). I have previously shown that
ψ∗H(L) > ψ
∗
H(H) ≥ ψ∗L(H)
Consider the event where ψ ∈ (ψ∗H(H), ψ∗H(L)) and an agent of type i who meets an
H type agent. If i = H, the pair will form a match and leave since ψ > ψ∗H(H). If
i = L, L will want to form a match withy H because ψ > ψ∗L(H) , but H will not
want to form a match sine ψ < ψ∗H(L). This means that a match will not form.
Thus, in the interval ψ∗H(H), an agent of type H does strictly better since in the
case where he meets another H agent, he obtains
uH(H | ψ) > CH(ψ∗H) ≥ CL(ψ∗L)
whereas L gets CL since ψ > ψ
∗
L(H). For all other realizations of ψ, i.e. (ψ
∗
H(H), ψ
∗
H(L))
c,
the expected utility of H and L are the same. Thus, the expected utility of H is
strictly greated than the expected utility of L over the entire support of ψ.
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Corollary (5)
Proof. As I have shown in the previous proof, proving that CH > CL is equivalent
to proving this corollary. The corollary trivially follows.
Proposition (13)
Proof.
There are four claims to prove. (1) is easy to see from the Bellman equation from
which the thresholds are derived:
Vi(ψ | j) = max{θj + ψ
1− δ , δ(αVi(ψ | H) + (1− α)Vi(ψ | L))− pi} (2.29)
The price enters the optimization problem of the agents as a negative constant,
proving the result. From (2.29), note that both terms in the Bellman equation are
strictly increasing in δ, proving (2). I proceed with proving (3). Note that proving
(3) is equivalent to proving (4) by (2.28).
Fix an agent H. There are then two cases. The first is when H never matches
with L (separating equilibrium). This may be due to a variety of reasons. Some
explanations include the difference in their types (θH − θL) being extremely large,
or that the draw ψ was very bad. Whatever it is, an increase in α in this first case
obviously increases the continuation value for H since it increases the probability
that H meets another H, which then increases the chance that H will find a match
in any given period.
The second case is when H matches with L. Consider now an αold and a corre-
sponding CH,old with strategies ψ
∗
H,old = {ψ∗H(H, old), ψ∗H(L, old)}. Let αnew > αold.
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Consider a strategy
ψ∗H,new = {ψ∗H(H, new), ψ∗H(L, new)}
where ψ∗H,new = ψ
∗
H,old for all agents in the proportion αold and ψ
∗
H(H, new) =
ψ∗H(H, old) for all ‘new’ agents in the proportion αnew − αold. In words, this means
that this new strategy is the same for the proportion of agents who were and currently
are H types and is different for the proportion of agents who are now H instead of
being L types before. For the proportion of agents who are H types now instead of
L, this new strategy employs the cutoff strategy that H would use when faced with
L agents in the past.
This would imply that from the proportion αold, we get that
CH,new,αold = CH,old
and from the new proportion αnew − αold, we have that
CH,new,αnew−αold = (αnew − αold)uH(L | ψ∗H(L, old))
This gives that
CH,new = CH,new,αnew−αold + CH,new,αold > CH,old
which is true because uH(L | ψ∗H(L, old)) ≥ 0 and αnew − αold > 0. By the definition
of optimality, it is true that the optimal threshold strategy ψ∗H does strictly better
than any other strategy for the agent. Thus,
CH(ψ
∗
H) > CH(ψ) for any other ψ
Thus, as α increases, the continuation value CH increases as well.
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Proposition (14)
Proof.
The proof for this proposition was already done in-text. I repeat it here. The steady-
state profit is given by
Πss = i f +
δ i p
1− δ(1− o(p)) (2.30)
Note that there is only one participation constraint and this binds since monopolist
can fully observe types. This gives that C = f . This also implies that the monopolist
extracts all surplus from the agents by using a combination of p and f .
The expected lifetime utility of agents can be broken up into the following ex-
pression
EU ≡ U(ψ∗)− f − pD(ψ∗)
where U=matching utility, andD=expected number of dates the agent goes on before
leaving the platform. Taking first-order conditions gives
∂EU
∂ψ∗ = 0 =⇒
∂U(ψ∗)
∂ψ
= p
∂D(ψ∗)
∂ψ∗ =⇒ p = 0
The profit function also linearly increases in i, which implies that the monopolist
optimally sets i = 1. This fully characterizes the solution to the monopolist’s opti-
mization problem.
Proposition (15)
Proof. The proof for this proposition was already done in-text. I repeat it here.
Fix α, iH , iL, and all the parameters in the model. In the one platform case, there
are three thresholds of interest: ψ∗H(L), ψ
∗
L(L), and ψ
∗
H(H). All three thresholds are
functions of α, which is the proportion of studs on the platform. In the two platform
case there are only two thresholds of interest, one for each of the platforms. I define
these two thresholds to be ψ∗H and ψ
∗
L. In particular, in the separate platforms case
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the studs only need to worry about their thresholds to marry another studs, and the
same goes for the duds. To simplify the analysis, I equalize the outflow rates for both
types on both configurations of platforms. There are two main reasons for doing so.
The first is to make the problem tractable by simplifying the calculations done later
in the proof. The second is because I would like to utilize optimality conditions to
aid in the proof. To see this, consider the outflows for the one platform case that
are a result of the optimal pricing strategy of the firm and consider an arbitrary
pricing strategy for the two platform case that gives outflows for both types exactly
equal to that of the one platform case. If I can show that even under this arbitrary
pricing strategy the monopolist profit for operating two separate platforms is higher
than that of operating a single platform, then optimality conditions dictate that the
optimal pricing strategy for operating two separate platforms will necessarily do at
least as well.
Now, recall that the outflow rate for H types while on the mixed platform is
oH,one platform = α(1− F (ψ∗H(H))) + (1− α)(1− F (ψ∗H(L)))
= 1− αF (ψ∗H(H)) + (1− α)F (ψ∗H(L))
Similarly, the outflow rate for L types while on the mixed platform is
oL,one platform = α(1− F (ψ∗H(L))) + (1− α)(1− F (ψ∗L(L)))
= 1− αF (ψ∗H(L)) + (1− α)F (ψ∗L(L))
The outflow rates for the H and L platforms are defined, respectively, as
oH,two platforms = 1− F (ψ∗H)
oL,two platforms = 1− F (ψ∗L)
Setting oH,two platforms = oH,one platform and oL,two platforms = oL,one platform gives the fol-
lowing two relationships between the thresholds of both platform configurations.
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F (ψ∗H) = αF (ψ
∗
H(H)) + (1− α)F (ψ∗H(L)) (2.31)
F (ψ∗L) = αF (ψ
∗
H(L)) + (1− α)F (ψ∗L(L)) (2.32)
(2.31) then gives that ψ∗H(L) ≥ ψ∗H ≥ ψ∗H(H) and (2.32) gives ψ∗H(L) ≥ ψ∗L ≥ ψ∗L(L).
Now, I define the profit for H and L types when the monopolist only operates 1
platform. Without loss of generality, I assume that the support for ψ is [0,m].
ΠH,1 =
∞∑
t=0
δt(1− oH)t
(1− δ) iHoH
(
α
∫ m
ψ∗H(H)
(θH+ψ) f(ψ) dψ+(1−α)
∫ m
ψ∗H(L)
(θL+ψ) f(ψ) dψ
)
(2.33)
ΠL,1 =
∞∑
t=0
δt(1− oL)t
(1− δ) iLoL
(
α
∫ m
ψ∗H(L)
(θH+ψ) f(ψ) dψ+(1−α)
∫ m
ψ∗L(L)
(θL+ψ) f(ψ) dψ
)
(2.34)
Simplifying (2.33) gives
ΠH,1 =
oH
(
θH +
(
α
∫ m
ψ∗H(H)
(θH + ψ) f(ψ) dψ + (1− α)
∫ m
ψ∗H(L)
(θL + ψ) f(ψ) dψ
))
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− oH))
and doing the same for (2.34) gives
ΠL,1 =
oL
(
θL +
(
α
∫ m
ψ∗H(L)
(θH + ψ) f(ψ) dψ + (1− α)
∫ m
ψ∗L(L)
(θL + ψ) f(ψ) dψ
))
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− oL))
The profit functions for types H and L for the case when there are two separate
platforms is
ΠH,2 =
oH
(
θH +
∫ m
ψ∗H
ψ f(ψ) dψ
)
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− oH))
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ΠL,2 =
oL
(
θL +
∫ m
ψ∗L
ψ f(ψ) dψ
)
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− oL))
To show that the monopolist can do better when he operates two platforms instead
of one, I must show that
ΠH,2 + ΠL,2 ≥ ΠH,1 + ΠL,1
To do this, I separately show that ΠH,2 ≥ ΠH,1 and ΠL,2 ≥ ΠL,1. I first prove
that ΠH,2 ≥ ΠH,1. Taking the differences between the profits under both platform
configurations gives
ΠH,2 − ΠH,1 = cH
(∫ m
ψ∗H
ψ f(ψ) dψ − α
∫ m
ψ∗H(H)
ψ f(ψ) dψ − (1− α)
∫ m
ψ∗H(L)
ψ f(ψ) dψ
)
where cH ≡ oH(1−δ)(1−δ(1−oH)) is a positive constant. Thus, I must now prove that∫ m
ψ∗H
ψ f(ψ) dψ − α
∫ m
ψ∗H(H)
ψ f(ψ) dψ − (1− α)
∫ m
ψ∗H(L)
ψ f(ψ) dψ ≥ 0
Rearranging terms and using the fact that ψ∗H(L) ≥ ψ∗H ≥ ψ∗H(H) gives that this
condition reduces to
1
α
∫ ψ∗H(L)
ψ∗H
ψ f(ψ) dψ − 1
1− α
∫ ψ∗H
ψ∗H(H)
ψ f(ψ) dψ ≥ 0
Note now that the thresholds ψ∗H(H) and ψ
∗
H(L) are both functions of α. When
ψ∗H(L) = ψ
∗
H(H), the condition is automatically satisfied since both integrals will
be 0. Now I want to show that as the gap between the two thresholds ψ∗H(H) and
ψ∗H(L) increases, the condition still holds. To do this, for any value of α, fix ψ
∗
H(H).
By showing that the derivative of the right-hand side of the condition is increasing
in ψ∗H(L), I will have shown that the condition holds.
Rewriting the condition by holding ψ∗H(H) constant and varying ψ
∗
H as functions
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of ψ∗H(L) gives me
1
α
∫ ψ∗H(L)
ψ∗H(ψ
∗
H(L))
ψ f(ψ) dψ − 1
1− α
∫ ψ∗H(ψ∗H(L))
ψ∗H(H)
ψ f(ψ) dψ ≥ 0
Taking the derivative of the left-hand side of the condition with respect to ψ∗H(L) by
using the Leibniz Rule gives
∂LHS
∂ψ∗H(L)
=
1
α
(∫ ψ∗H(L)
ψ∗H(ψ
∗
H(L))
0 dψ + ψ∗H(L) f(ψ
∗
H(L))× 1− ψ∗H f(ψ∗H)
∂ψ∗H(ψ
∗
H(L))
∂ψ∗H(L)
)
− 1
1− α
(∫ ψ∗H(ψ∗H(L))
ψ∗H(H)
0 dψ + ψ∗H f(ψ
∗
H)
∂ψ∗H(ψ
∗
H(L))
∂ψ∗H(L)
− ψ∗H(H) f(ψ∗H(H))× 0
)
Recall that
1− F (ψ∗H) = α(1− F (ψ∗H(H))) + (1− α)(1− F (ψ∗H(L)))
=⇒ F (ψ∗H) = αF (ψ∗H(H)) + (1− α)F (ψ∗H(L))
=⇒ ψ∗H = F−1(αF (ψ∗H(H)) + (1− α)F (ψ∗H(L)))
=⇒ ∂ψ∗H(ψ∗H(L))
∂ψ∗H(L)
=
(1−α)F ′ (ψ∗H(L))
F ′ (ψ∗H)
=⇒ ∂ψ∗H(ψ∗H(L))
∂ψ∗H(L)
=
(1−α)f(ψ∗H(L))
f(ψ∗H)
Substituting this into the earlier condition and simplifying gives
∂LHS
∂ψ∗H(L)
=
1
α
ψ∗H(L) f(ψ
∗
H(L))−
1
α
ψ∗H f(ψ
∗
H)
(1− α)f(ψ∗H(L))
f(ψ∗H)
− 1
(1− α)ψ
∗
H f(ψ
∗
H)
(1− α)f(ψ∗H(L))
f(ψ∗H)
which, when simplified, gives that
1
α
ψ∗H(L)f(ψ
∗
H(L))−
1
α
ψ∗Hf(ψ
∗
H(L))
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=⇒ 1
α
f(ψ∗H(L))(ψ
∗
H(L)− ψ∗H) ≥ 0
where the last inequality is true since ψ∗H(L) ≥ ψ∗H . Thus, I have demonstrated that
ΠH,2 ≥ ΠH,1. Now, I move on to showing that ΠL,2 ≥ ΠL,1. First, note that
ΠL,2−ΠL,1 = cL
(∫ m
ψ∗L
ψ f(ψ)ψ−α
∫ m
ψ∗H(L)
ψ f(ψ) dψ− (1−α)
∫ m
ψ∗L(L)
ψ f(ψ) dψ
)
≥ 0
where cL =
oL
(1−δ)(1−δ(1−oL)) is a nonnegative constant. Using the fact that ψ
∗
H(L) ≥
ψ∗L ≥ ψ∗L(L) then reduces the condition to showing that
1
(1− α)
∫ ψ∗H(L)
ψ∗L
ψ f(ψ) dψ − 1
α
∫ ψ∗L
ψ∗L(L)
ψ f(ψ) dψ ≥ 0
As before, note that when ψ∗H(L) is exactly equal to ψ
∗
L(L), the condition trivially
holds since both integrals will be 0. I now hold ψ∗L(L) fixed and vary ψ
∗
H(L). If I
can show that this condition holds when I vary ψ∗H(L), I will have shown that the
condition always holds true. To do this, I also assume that ψ∗L varies with ψ
∗
H(L).
Rewriting the condition then gives the following inequality
1
(1− α)
∫ ψ∗H(L)
ψ∗L(ψ
∗
H(L))
ψ f(ψ) dψ − 1
α
∫ ψ∗L(ψ∗H(L))
ψ∗L(L)
ψ f(ψ) dψ ≥ 0
Taking the derivatives of the left-hand side of this inequality with respect to ψ∗H(L)
by using the Leibniz Rule gives
∂LHS
∂ψ∗H(L)
=
1
(1− α)
(
ψ∗H(L) f(ψ
∗
H(L))− ψ∗Lf(ψ∗L)
∂ψ∗L(ψ
∗
H(L))
∂ψ∗H(L)
)
−
1
α
(
ψ∗Lf(ψ
∗
L)
∂ψ∗L(ψ
∗
H(L))
∂ψ∗H(L)
− ψ∗L(L)f(ψ∗L(L))
)
Using the fact that F (ψ∗L) = αF (ψ
∗
H(L)) + (1−α)F (ψ∗L(L)), I can then solve for ψ∗L
to find that
ψ∗L = F
−1(αF (ψ∗H(L)) + (1− α)F (ψ∗L(L)))
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which in turn gives that
∂ψ∗L(ψ
∗
H(L))
∂ψ∗H(L)
=
αf(ψ∗H(L))
f(ψ∗L)
Substituting this derivative into the condition gives
∂LHS
∂ψ∗H(L)
=
1
1− αψ
∗
H(L)f(ψ
∗
H(L))−
1
1− αψ
∗
Lf(ψ
∗
L)
αf(ψ∗H(L))
f(ψ∗L)
− 1
α
ψ∗Lf(ψ
∗
L)
αf(ψ∗H(L))
f(ψ∗L)
+
1
α
ψ∗L(L)f(ψ
∗
L(L))
=⇒ ∂LHS
∂ψ∗H(L)
=
1
(1− α)(ψ
∗
H(L)− ψ∗L)f(ψ∗H(L)) +
1
α
ψ∗L(L)f(ψ
∗
L(L)) ≥ 0
where the last inequality holds since ψ has nonnegative support and ψ∗H(L) ≥ ψ∗L. I
have thus demonstrated that ΠL,2 ≥ ΠL,1, which in turns implies that
Π2 = ΠH,2 + ΠL,2 ≥ ΠH,1 + ΠL,1 = Π1
Proposition (16)
Proof.
Recall the optimization problem for the monopolist firm.
max
pH ,pL,fH ,fL
Πss(α(pH , pL), pH , pL)
s.t. (IRH) CH(α(pH , pL), pH)− fH ≥ 0
(IRL) CL(α(pH , pL), pH , pL)− fL ≥ 0
subject to the steady-state conditions. I must demonstrate that the monopolist firm
charges a combination of p = (pH , pL) and f = (fH , fL) so that the individual ratio-
nality constraints hold. This is very easy to see. Remember that types are perfectly
observable. Suppose, for a contradiction, that one or both of the IR constraints is
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slack. The firm can then either increase or decrease p and charge the corresponding
fixed price to extract the maximum possible surplus from agents.
Proposition (17)
Proof. The proof for this proposition was already done in-text. I repeat it here.
Consider the strategy where pH , pL is significantly high to induce all agents to leave
the platform immediately. In this strategy, the corresponding outflow rates for both
types will be exactly 1. Given that oH = oL = 1, I then note that the only way in
which changing iL affects TSS is by affecting how quickly the agents match, which is
expressed through the outflow rates. Given that the outflow rates are held constant
at 1, under this pricing strategy, the TSS becomes an increasing linear function in
iL, implying that the firm optimally sets iL = 1. Now, all that remains to be shown
is the optimality of charging prices that make all agents leave immediately.
By evaluating the summation in (2.21), I can write the expression as
TSS = µH(
iHθH
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− oH))) + µL(
iLθL
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− oH))) (2.35)
By taking derivatives, I note that
∂TSS
∂oH
,
∂TSS
∂oL
≥ 0
which implies that the optimal pricing strategy is then to set oL = oH = 1. Under
this pricing strategy, I have shown earlier that the corresponding optimal inflows are
iL = iH = 1.
Proposition (18)
Proof. The proof for this proposition was already done in-text. I repeat it here.
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Consider again the expression for total social surplus. Since the matching utility is
additively separable, I may write the total social surplus as
Total Social Surplus (TSS) =
∑
j∈{L,H}
µj
∞∑
t=0
( θj
1− δ +
E(ψ | j matches)
1− δ
)
δt(1−oj)tij
(2.36)
where µj is the mass of type θj on the platform. By the same reasoning as in the
previous proposition, given the pricing strategy where the firm sets per-interaction
prices sufficiently high to force everyone to match in the first period, it is clear that
iH = iL = 1. Now, consider two pricing scenarios:
1. Per-interaction prices are set sufficiently high to force everyone to match in the
first period and oH = oL = 1.
2. Per-interaction prices are set such that ∃ some measure λH of H agents and
λL of L agents that wait on the platform and do not immediately match.
By assumption of the bounded support of ψ, the worst draw that any agent can
obtain is any period is ψ = 0 and the best is ψ = m. Thus, I can bound the total
social surplus from scenario 1 by the case where agents obtain a shock of ψ = 0 in
each period:
TSS1 ≥ µH( θH
1− δ ) + µL(
θL
1− δ )
Note that the proportion (1 − λH) and (1 − λL) of H and L agents, respectively, I
can write the total social surplus in scenario 2 as:
TSS2 = λHµH TSS2,H + λLµL TSS2,L + (1− λH)µH TSS1,H + (1− λL)µL TSS1,L
where TSSn,j is the total surplus obtained from j ∈ {L,H} in case n ∈ {1, 2}.
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I now want to show that TSS1 − TSS2 ≥ 0 for some parameter range. To do
this, I compare the worst case scenario under pricing strategy 1, which is that agents
obtain ψ = 0 in all subsequent periods, and the best case scenario under pricing
strategy 2, which is that agents wait for a period and obtain ψ = m in the following
period. Under the best case scenario in the second pricing strategy, agents will leave
in the next period since that case is the one where they obtain the most they can
while on the platform and the firm then extracts δ(
θj+m
1−δ ) from each agent of type
j ∈ {L,H}.
Taking the difference between the social surpluses gives
λHµH
(
θH
1−δ − δ( θH+m1−δ )
)
+ λLµL
(
θL
1−δ − δ( θL+m1−δ )
)
≥ 0
⇐⇒ λHµH
(
θH − δm1−δ
)
+ λLµL
(
θL − δm1−δ
)
≥ 0
⇐⇒ θL − δm1−δ ≥ 0
⇐⇒ θL
m
≥ δ
1−δ
Proposition (19)
Proof. Under this pricing strategy, iH = iL = oH = oL = 1. This gives that
α =
iHoL
iHoL + iLoH
=
1
1 + 1
=
1
2
Since the expected matching utility for any agent is independent of her own type,
the expected matching utility (before prices) for each agent is the same and given by,
assuming (without loss of generality) that ψ is distributed on [0,m], the following
expression
C = δ
(1
2
∫ m
0
θH + ψ
1− δ f(ψ)dψ +
1
2
∫ m
0
θL + ψ
1− δ f(ψ)dψ
)
Since the most the monopolist can extract is precisely this amount, it has to be the
case that fixed prices are set so that
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C − δpH = fH
and
C − δpL = fL
This proves that fH = fL and pH and pL sufficiently high (but not necessarily the
same) to induce the agents to choose to leave immediately.
Proposition (20)
Proof.
Fix the pricing strategy for L and consider the following two pricing strategies for
H. Without loss of generality and for ease of exposition, consider the increase of
iL to be . The trick is to manipulate the strategies to give the same α, since the
perturbations are done for the L type and the H type’s problem can be kept constant
with a fixed pH and α.
Strategy 1 (old) : iL,old = 1−  and pL,old
Strategy 2 (new) : iL,new = 1 and pL,new > pL,old
Why these two strategies? Well, look at the expression of α given by
α(pH , pL) =
iH
oH(pH)
iH
oH(pH)
+ iL
oL(pH ,pL)
=
iH
oH(pH)
iHoL(pH ,pL)+iLoH(pH)
oH(pH)oL(pH ,pL)
=
iHoL(pH , pL)
iHoL(pH , pL) + iLoH(pH)
Increasing iL from the old to new strategy decreases α. To keep α constant, the firm
can then manipulate pL to increase oL. Since oL partly depends on L’s threshold,
and the threshold strictly decreases with prices, the firm can increase pL in order
to decrease L’s threshold (effectively making L less picky), forcing Ls to exit the
platform faster. This explains why pL,new > pL,old. So then the question is: what
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outflow rates or probability of matching for L will keep α constant?
Define
oL,i ≡ Probability that L matches under strategy i
di ≡ Number of dates that L goes on before matching under strategy i.
Computing the expected number of dates that L goes under both pricing strategies
gives
E(d1) =
∞∑
t=1
oL,1 (1− oL,1)t−1 t = 1
oL,1
E(d2) =
1
oL,2
Keeping the mass of L agents on the platform equal under both strategies gives
µL,1 ≡ 1− 
oL,1
=
1
oL,2
≡ µL,2 =⇒ oL,2 = oL,1
1− 
Now, recall that ψ is drawn from the interval [0,m]. Feasible utility ranges for L are
then [θL, θL + m] when matching with L and [θH , θH + m] when matching with H.
Let φ∗t ≡ L’s utility threshold when matching with type t. Then the probabilities of
acceptance are:
P (L accepts L) = P (φL ≥ φ∗L) =
θL +m− φ∗L
m
P (H accepts L) = P (φH ≥ φ∗H) =
θH +m− φ∗H
m
Fixing the pricing strategy for H types implies that H’s decision is fixed, which
means φ∗H is fixed. Define the expected utility for L of matching in any period under
strategy i is defined as
UL(φ
∗
H , φ
∗
L,i) =
1
2
(α(φ∗H + θH +m) + (1− α)(φ∗L + θL +m))
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and the outflow rate for L types under pricing strategy i is defined as
oL,i(φ
∗
H , φ
∗
L,i) =
1
m
(α(m+ θH − φ∗H) + (1− α)(m+ θL − φ∗L,i)
Note that going from pricing strategy 1 to 2 requires that φ∗L changes. To find the
changed threshold utility value, solve
oL,2 =
oL,1
1− 
=⇒ φ∗L,2 =
φ∗L,1 − αφ∗L,1 − (m+ θL + α(θH − θL)− αφ∗H)
(1− )(1− α)
We can write out expected lifetime utilities:
EU2 =
∞∑
t=1
δt−1
oL,1
1− (1−
oL,1
1− )
t−1UL(φ∗H , φ
∗
L,2)
EU1 =
∞∑
t=1
δt−1oL,1(1− oL,1)t−1UL(φ∗H , φ∗L,1)
Now, I would like to algebraically show that
lim
→0
EU2 − (1− )EU1

> 0
This establishes the result that profit for the monopolist is strictly higher under pric-
ing strategy 2 than 1, since the profit that the monopolist can extract from each agent
is precisely the expected lifetime utility of the agent, and so the aggregrate profit
that the monopolist extracts is iL times the expected lifetime utility. Algebraically,
lim
→0
EU2 − (1− )EU1

=
a
2(m+ δ(α(θH + ∗H(L)) + (1− α)(θL + ∗L(L))))2
> 0
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Corollary (8)
Proof.
This corollary follows from the previous proposition. Note that the condition on the
proposition that ψ∗L(L) ∈ (0,m) is a ‘global’ condition which is assumed to hold for
all pL.
Proposition (21)
Proof.
As in the previous proposition, consider the same two strategies that keep α constant.
Recall that types are observable =⇒ firm extracts all surplus from agents. The
most surplus that can be extracted is the expected discounted lifetime utility:
UL =
∞∑
t=0
δtoL(1− oL)t−1(αUL,H + (1− α)UL,L) (2.37)
where
oL = α(1− F (ψ∗H(L))) + (1− α)(1− F (ψ∗L(L)))
UL,H =
∫ m
ψ∗H(L)
θH + ψ
1− δ f(ψ) dψ
UL,L =
∫ m
ψ∗L(L)
θL + ψ
1− δ f(ψ) dψ
Since α is kept constant and we are fixing the pricing strategy for H, ψ∗H(L) is
unchanged. I also need to prove a couple lemmas to aid in the proof.
Lemma 14 The following are two characterizations of the threshold ψ∗L(L):
1. ψ∗L(L) is continuous with respect to pL.
2. Fix the parameters of the model. ψ∗L(L) obtains a maximum at pL = 0.
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Proof. First, we prove the first statement. From the equation
θL + ψ
∗
L(L)
1− δ =
δ(c1 + (1− α)
∫ a
ψ∗L(L)
θL+ψ
1−δ f(ψ) dψ − pL)
1− δ(c2 + (1− α)F (ψ∗L(L)))
where c1 = α
∫ a
ψ∗H(L)
θH+ψ
1−δ f(ψ) dψ and c2 = αF (ψ
∗
H(L)) are constants, since I am
again assuming that firm changes iL to keep α and H’s optimization problem the
same. Rewrite the equation in terms of prices:
pL = c1 +(1−α)
∫ a
ψ∗L(L)
θL + ψ
1− δ f(ψ) dψ−
(θL + ψ
∗
L(L))(1− δ(c2 + (1− α)F (ψ∗L(L))))
δ(1− δ)
The right-hand side of the above equation is a continuous function of ψ∗L(L). I can
then rewrite everything as
pL = g(ψ
∗
L(L))
where g is continuous. I would like to state now that
ψ∗L(L) = g
−1(pL)
I first need to show that the inverse exists. I can do this by showing that g is strictly
monotonic. To do this, I take derivatives.
g
′
(ψ∗L(L)) =
−(θL + ψ
∗
L(L))
1− δ f(ψ
∗
L(L))−
{1− δ(αF (ψ∗H(L)) + (1− α)F (ψ∗L(L))) + αδf(ψ∗L(L))(θL + ψ∗L(L))}
δ(1− δ)
=⇒ g′(ψ∗L(L)) < 0
This means that the inverse g
′
exists, and so ψ∗L(L) is continuous in pL. To prove
statement 2, a similar argument to the one made in finding the optimal price in the
baseline model applies.
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Lemma 15 The expected discounted lifetime utility for L satisfies the two following
conditions:
1. UL is continuous with respect to ψ
∗
L(L).
2. ψ∗L(L) = arg maxψ UL(ψ)
Proof.
First, I prove the first statement. Look at how UL is defined in (2.37). Since F is
continuously differentiable, the integrals UL,L and oL are continuous with respect to
ψ∗L(L), which makes UL continuous with respect to ψ
∗
L(L). From the definition of
optimality, we have that the second statement holds.
By the preceding lemmas, we get
∂UL
∂ψ∗L(L)
∣∣∣∣
pL=0
= 0
Recall that pL lowers the threshold ψ
∗
L(L), making L agents less picky. Thus, by
continuity,
∀ > 0 , ∃δ > 0 s.t. ∀ψ s.t.
| ψ∗L(L)− ψ |< δ =⇒ | UL(ψ)− UL(ψ∗L(L)) |< 
I have shown that increasing pL decreases ψ
∗
L(L) which, in turn, decreases UL. I have
also shown that the percentage decrease in UL from an increase in pL asymptotically
approaches 0. To show that total profit increases, I now need to show that the
percentage increase in µL is greater than the percentage decrease in UL as we increase
pL.
Recall that
µL =
iL
oL
=
iL
c+ (1− α)(1− F (ψ∗L(L)))
where c = α(1− F (ψ∗L(L))). Taking derivatives, we see that
∂µL
∂ψ∗L(L)
=
iL(1− α)f(ψ∗L(L))
(c+ (1− α)(1− F (ψ∗L(L)))2
>
iL(1− α)c
(c+ (1− α))2 > 0
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Since ψ∗L(L) is continuous in pL, for any ψ
∗
L(L) that the monopolist wishes to imple-
ment, it can choose the corresponding pL to do so. Thus, choosing pL to make
∂UL
∂ψ∗L(L)︸ ︷︷ ︸
decreases asymptotically to 0
<
∂µL
∂ψ∗L(L)︸ ︷︷ ︸
bounded below by a positive constant
ensures that profit strictly increases.
Corollary (9)
Proof. This corollary follows from the previous proposition. Note that I am per-
turbing the optimal pL around 0, which makes this result weaker than that of the
uniform distribution.
Proposition (22)
Proof.
Recall the monopolist optimization problem:
max
fH ,fL,pH ,pL
Π ≡ 2{αΠH + (1− α)ΠL}
s. t.
IRL : CL(pL)− fL ≥ 0
IRH : CH(pH)− fH ≥ 0
ICL : CL(pL)− fL ≥ CL(pH)− fH
ICH : CH(pH)− fH ≥ CH(pL)− fL
I would now like to show that the IRL and ICH constraints bind. I first show that
IRL has to bind.
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Suppose, for a contradiction, that IRL does not bind with equality. By ICH , I
have
CH(pH)− fH ≥ CH(pL)− fL ≥ CL(pL)− fL > 0
whereby the last inequality holds since CH(p) ≥ CL(p) for any price p in a steady-
state equilibrium (Proposition 12). Thus, IRH also does not bind with equality.
This implies that the monopolist can increase fH and fL by a small amount and
all constraints will still hold. This is a profitable deviation which cannot occur in
equilibrium; hence, the contradiction.
Now, I show that ICH must bind with equality. Suppose not, for a contradiction.
Thus,
CH(pH)− fH > CH(pL)− fL ≥ CL(pL)− fL = 0
This implies that the monopolist can strictly profit by increase fH by a small amount
without violating any of the constraints; thus, the contradiction.
Proposition (23)
Proof.
The proof for this proposition follows the proof from Proposition 18, noting that
the optimization problem when types are unobservable has strictly more constraints
than the optimization problem when types are observable. This being, the number
of contracts that the monopolist can offer to the agents is strictly fewer under un-
observable types than under observable types. In fact, the set of contracts under
unobservable types is a strict subset of the set of contracts under observable types.
This being, since the contract offered under Proposition 18 is optimal in the larger
set of contracts and is also a member of the smaller set of contracts (unobservable
types) since it does not differentiate between types, it is necessarily also the solution
within the set of smaller contracts.
Proposition (24)
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Proof.
This proof follows from Proposition 19 and the reasoning from Proposition 23.
Proposition: Given the parameter ranges for the examples computed in the
paper, monopolist profit is strictly increasing in iL when types are observable
and shocks ψ are large relative to types.
Proof.
There are 9 cases for possible matching behaviors: H1L1, H2L1, H2L2, H3L1,
H3L1, H4L1, H4L2, H5L1, and H5L2. Fixing the matching behavior, I can com-
pute the outflows and α as a function of q and iL.
1. H1L1 : ψ∗H(H), ψ
∗
H(L), ψ
∗
L(L) < 0
=⇒ oH = oL = 1 and α = 11+iL .
So profit, which is equal to total surplus, is given by
ΠH1L1 = (1 + iL)
(δ(θH + γq + iL(θL + γq))
(1− δ)(1 + iL)
)
Thus, ∂Π
∂iL
= δ(θL+γq)
1−δ > 0 for any range of parameters.
2. H2L1 : ψ∗H(H) < 0, ψ
∗
H(L) ∈ [0, γ), ψ∗L(L) < 0
=⇒ oH = α + (1− α)q, oL = αq + (1− α), α = 2
2−(1−iL)q+
√
4iL+(1−iL)2p2
=⇒ Profit can be written as
ΠH2L1 =
δ
1− δ
(iL(2qθH − qθL + iLqθL +√4iL + (1− iL)2q2θL
2− q + iLq +
√
4iL + (1− iL)2q2 − 2δ + 2qδ
+2qγ − q2γ + iLq2γ + q
√
4iL + (1− iL)2q2γ
2− q + iLq +
√
4iL + (1− iL)2q2 − 2δ + 2qδ
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+
2θH + q(
√
4iL + (1− iL)2q2θL + (2 +
√
4iL + (1− iL)2q2)γ − (1− iL)q(θL + γ))
(2− q + iLq +
√
4iL + (1− iL)2q2)(1− (1− q)(1− 2
2−(1−iL)q+
√
4iL+(1−iL)2q2
)δ)
)
3. H2L2 : ψ∗H(H) < 0, ψ
∗
H(L) ∈ [0, γ), ψ∗L(L) ∈ [0, γ)
=⇒ oH = α + (1− α)q, oL = q , α = 2
√
q
(1+iL)q+
√
4iL+(1−iL)2q
=⇒ Profit can be written as
ΠH2L2 =
2
√
qδ(
(1−q)θH
1−δ +
q(θH+γ)
1−δ )
(1+iL)
√
q+
√
4iL+(1−iL)2q
+
p
(
1− 2
√
q
(1+iL)
√
q
√
4iL+(1−iL)2q
)
(θL+γ)δ
1−δ
1− (1− p)(1− 2√q
(1+iL)
√
q+
√
4iL+(1−iL)2q
)
δ
+iL
( 2q3/2(θH+γ)δ
(1−δ)((1+iL)√q+
√
4iL+(1−iL)2q)
+
p
(
1− 2
√
q
(1+iL)
√
q
√
4iL+(1−iL)2q
)
(θL+γ)δ
1−δ
1− 2(1−q)δ
√
q
(1+iL)
√
q+
√
4iL+(1−iL)2q
− (1− p)δ(1− 2√q
(1+iL)
√
q+
√
4iL+(1−iL)2q
))
4. H3L1 : ψ∗H(H) < 0, ψ
∗
H(L) ≥ γ, ψ∗L(L) < 0
=⇒ oH = α, oL = 1− α, α = 11+√iL
=⇒ Profit may be written as
ΠH3L1 =
(θH + qγ)δ
(1− δ)(1 +√iL(1− δ))
+ iL
( √iL(θL + pγ)δ
(1 +
√
iL − δ)(1− δ)
)
5. H3L2 : ψ∗H(H) < 0, ψ
∗
H(L) ≥ γ, ψ∗L(L) ∈ [0, γ).
=⇒ oH = α, oL = (1− α)q, α = 1
1+
√
iL√
p
=⇒ Profit may be written as
ΠH3L2 =
√
q(θH + qγ)δ
(
√
q +
√
iL(1− δ))(1− δ)
+iL
( √iLqδ(θL + γ)
(1− δ)(√q(1− q) +√iL(1− δ(1− q))
)
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6. H4L1 : ψ∗H(H) ∈ [0, γ), ψ∗H(L) ∈ [0, γ), ψ∗L(L) < 0
=⇒ oH = q, oL = αq + (1− α), α = 2−q+iLq−
√
q
√
4iL+(1−iL)2q
2(1−q)
=⇒ Profit may be written as
ΠH4L1 =
qδ
(
(2− q + iLq −√q
√
4iL + q − 2iLq + i2L)θH +
√
q
√
4iL + q − 2iLq + i2LqθL
)
2(1− p)(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p))
+
qδ
(
2γ − q(θL + iLθL + 2γ)
)
2(1− p)(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p))
+
iLδ(−q3/2
√−2iL(−2 + q) + q + i2LqθH +√q√−2iL(−2 + q) + q + i2LqθL)
(1− q)(1− δ)(2 + (−2 + q − iLq +√q
√
4iL + q − 2iLq + i2Lq)δ)
+
iLδ(p
2((iL − 1)θH − 2γ) + p(2θH − (1 + iL)θL + 2γ))
(1− q)(1− δ)(2 + (−2 + q − iLq +√q
√
4iL + q − 2iLq + i2Lq)δ)
7. H4L2 : ψ∗H(H) ∈ [0, γ), ψ∗H(L) ∈ [0, γ), ψ∗L(L) ∈ [0, γ)
=⇒ oH = q, oL = q, α = 11+iL
=⇒ Profit may be written as
ΠH4L2 = (1 + iL)
( q(θH + γ + iL(θL + γ))δ
(1 + iL)(1− δ)(1− δ(1− q))
)
8. H5L1 : ψ∗H(H) ∈ [0, γ), ψ∗H(L) ≥ γ, ψ∗L(L) < 0
=⇒ oH = αq, oL = 1− α, α = 11+√iL√p
=⇒ Profit may be written as
ΠH5L1 =
qδ(θH + γ)
(1− δ)(1 +√iL√q(1− δ)− δ(1− p))
+iL
( √iL√q(θL + qγ)δ
(1− δ)(1 +√iL√q − δ)
)
9. H5L2 : ψ∗H(H) ∈ [0, γ), ψ∗H(L) ≥ γ, ψ∗L(L) ∈ [0, γ)
=⇒ oH = αq, oL = (1− α)q, α = 11+√iL
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=⇒ Profit may be written as
ΠH5L2 =
qδ(θH + γ)
(1− δ)(1 +√iL(1− δ)− δ(1− q))
+iL
( √iLqδ(θL + γ)
(1− δ)(1− δ +√iL(1− δ(1− q))
)
Now, I consider the four examples in the paper. Using the parameters in each of
these examples, I can compute the derivative of the profit function with respect to
iL. I would like to show that the derivative of the profit function with respect to iL
is always strictly positive.
• Example 10: θH = 4, θL = 1, γ = 2, δ = 0.9, p = 12 .
– ∂ΠH1L1
∂iL
= 18 > 0 ∀iL ∈ [0, 1]
– ∂ΠH2L1
∂iL
∈ [20.18, 26.59] where profit is strictly increasing for iL ∈ [0, 1]
– ∂ΠH2L2
∂iL
∈ [25.33, 26.59] where profit is strictly increasing for iL ∈ [0, 1]
– ∂ΠH3L1
∂iL
∈ (−∞, 15.25] where profit is strictly convex with a min at iL = 0.03
– ∂ΠH3L2
∂iL
∈ (−∞, 20.55] where profit is strictly convex with a min at iL = 0.03
– ∂ΠH4L1
∂iL
∈ [19.99, 24.55] where profit is strictly increasing for iL ∈ [0, 1]
– ∂ΠH4L2
∂iL
∈ [19.99, 24.55] where profit is strictly increasing for iL ∈ [0, 1]
– ∂ΠH5L1
∂iL
∈ (−∞, 14.27] where profit is strictly convex with a min at iL = 0.05
– ∂ΠH5L2
∂iL
∈ (−∞, 19.17] where profit is strictly convex with a min at iL = 0.06
The derivative of the profit function for each of the fixed matching behaviors
except cases H3L1, H3L2, H5L1, and H5L2 with respect to iL is always strictly
positive. For each of the cases H3L1, H3L2, H5L1, and H5L2, the derivative is
decreasing up till a certain value of iL, and increases for values of iL after that
threshold. I can plot the profit function for each of these cases to obtain that
the function is strictly convex in iL, with a minimum achieved at the threshold
values of iL. In particular, comparing the endpoints (where iL = 0 and iL = 1),
I obtain the following results:
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– Case H3L1 : Π |iL=0= 45,Π |iL=1= 57.27
– Case H3L2 : Π |iL=0= 45,Π |iL=1= 61.17
– Case H5L1 : Π |iL=0= 49.09,Π |iL=1= 59.27
– Case H5L2 : Π |iL=0= 49.09,Π |iL=1= 62.31
These results show that the profit function is always strictly increasing in iL
for high values of iL; in particular, the monopolist maximizes profit in all cases
by setting iL = 1.
• Example 11: θH = 3.5, θL = 1.5, γ = 2, δ = 0.9, p = 12 .
– ∂ΠH1L1
∂iL
= 22.5 > 0 ∀iL ∈ [0, 1]
– ∂ΠH2L1
∂iL
∈ [24.58, 31.95] where profit is strictly increasing for iL ∈ [0, 1]
– ∂ΠH2L2
∂iL
∈ [29.53, 31.95] where profit is strictly increasing for iL ∈ [0, 1]
– ∂ΠH3L1
∂iL
∈ (−∞, 19.71] where profit is strictly convex with a min at iL = 0.02
– ∂ΠH3L2
∂iL
∈ (−∞, 24.62] where profit is strictly convex with a min at iL = 0.02
– ∂ΠH4L1
∂iL
∈ [24.23, 28.64] where profit is strictly increasing for iL ∈ [0, 1]
– ∂ΠH4L2
∂iL
= 28.64 > 0 ∀iL ∈ [0, 1]
– ∂ΠH5L1
∂iL
∈ (−∞, 18.66] where profit is strictly convex with a min at iL = 0.03
– ∂ΠH5L2
∂iL
∈ (−∞, 23.17] where profit is strictly convex with a min at iL = 0.04
The derivative of the profit function for each of the fixed matching behaviors
except cases H3L1, H3L2, H5L1, and H5L2 with respect to iL is always strictly
positive. For each of the cases H3L1, H3L2, H5L1, and H5L2, the derivative is
decreasing up till a certain value of iL, and increases for values of iL after that
threshold. I can plot the profit function for each of these cases to obtain that
the function is strictly convex in iL, with a minimum achieved at the threshold
values of iL. In particular, comparing the endpoints (where iL = 0 and iL = 1),
I obtain the following results:
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– Case H3L1 : Π |iL=0= 40.5,Π |iL=1= 57.27
– Case H3L2 : Π |iL=0= 40.5,Π |iL=1= 60.86
– Case H5L1 : Π |iL=0= 45,Π |iL=1= 59.59
– Case H5L2 : Π |iL=0= 45,Π |iL=1= 62.31
These results show that the profit function is always strictly increasing in iL
for high values of iL; in particular, the monopolist maximizes profit in all cases
by setting iL = 1.
• Example 12: θH = 3, θL = 2, γ = 2, δ = 0.9, p = 12 .
– ∂ΠH1L1
∂iL
= 22.5 > 0 ∀iL ∈ [0, 1]
– ∂ΠH2L1
∂iL
∈ [28.99, 37.31] where profit is strictly increasing for iL ∈ [0, 1]
– ∂ΠH2L2
∂iL
∈ [33.31, 33.73] where profit is strictly increasing for iL ∈ [0, 1]
– ∂ΠH3L1
∂iL
∈ (−∞, 24.17] where profit is strictly convex with a min at iL = 0.01
– ∂ΠH3L2
∂iL
∈ (−∞, 28.70] where profit is strictly convex with a min at iL = 0.02
– ∂ΠH4L1
∂iL
∈ [28.47, 32.73] where profit is strictly increasing for iL ∈ [0, 1]
– ∂ΠH4L2
∂iL
= 32.73 > 0
– ∂ΠH5L1
∂iL
∈ (−∞, 23.06] where profit is strictly convex with a min at iL = 0.02
– ∂ΠH5L2
∂iL
∈ (−∞, 27.16] where profit is strictly convex with a min at iL = 0.03
The derivative of the profit function for each of the fixed matching behaviors
except cases H3L1, H3L2, H5L1, and H5L2 with respect to iL is always strictly
positive. For each of the cases H3L1, H3L2, H5L1, and H5L2, the derivative is
decreasing up till a certain value of iL, and increases for values of iL after that
threshold. I can plot the profit function for each of these cases to obtain that
the function is strictly convex in iL, with a minimum achieved at the threshold
values of iL. In particular, comparing the endpoints (where iL = 0 and iL = 1),
I obtain the following results:
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– Case H3L1 : Π |iL=0= 36,Π |iL=1= 57.27
– Case H3L2 : Π |iL=0= 36,Π |iL=1= 60.54
– Case H5L1 : Π |iL=0= 40.91,Π |iL=1= 59.90
– Case H5L2 : Π |iL=0= 40.91,Π |iL=1= 62.31
These results show that the profit function is always strictly increasing in iL
for high values of iL; in particular, the monopolist maximizes profit in all cases
by setting iL = 1.
• Example 13: θH = 4.5, θL = 0.5, γ = 2, δ = 0.9, p = 12 .
– ∂ΠH1L1
∂iL
= 13.5 > 0 ∀iL ∈ [0, 1]
– ∂ΠH2L1
∂iL
∈ [15.78, 21.23] where profit is strictly increasing for iL ∈ [0, 1]
– ∂ΠH2L2
∂iL
∈ [21.13, 21.42] where profit is strictly increasing for iL ∈ [0, 1]
– ∂ΠH3L1
∂iL
∈ (−∞, 10.79] where profit is strictly convex with a min at iL = 0.05
– ∂ΠH3L2
∂iL
∈ (−∞, 16.47] where profit is strictly convex with a min at iL = 0.05
– ∂ΠH4L1
∂iL
∈ [15.75, 20.45] where profit is strictly increasing for iL ∈ [0, 1]
– ∂ΠH4L2
∂iL
= 20.45 > 0
– ∂ΠH5L1
∂iL
∈ (−∞, 9.88] where profit is strictly convex with a min at iL = 0.09
– ∂ΠH5L2
∂iL
∈ (−∞, 15.18] where profit is strictly convex with a min at iL = 0.08
The derivative of the profit function for each of the fixed matching behaviors
except cases H3L1, H3L2, H5L1, and H5L2 with respect to iL is always strictly
positive. For each of the cases H3L1, H3L2, H5L1, and H5L2, the derivative is
decreasing up till a certain value of iL, and increases for values of iL after that
threshold. I can plot the profit function for each of these cases to obtain that
the function is strictly convex in iL, with a minimum achieved at the threshold
values of iL. In particular, comparing the endpoints (where iL = 0 and iL = 1),
I obtain the following results:
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– Case H3L1 : Π |iL=0= 49.5,Π |iL=1= 57.27
– Case H3L2 : Π |iL=0= 49.5,Π |iL=1= 61.49
– Case H5L1 : Π |iL=0= 53.18,Π |iL=1= 58.95
– Case H5L2 : Π |iL=0= 53.18,Π |iL=1= 62.31
These results show that the profit function is always strictly increasing in iL
for high values of iL; in particular, the monopolist maximizes profit in all cases
by setting iL = 1.
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